Health and Welfare by University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 3 Article 18
1-1-1997
Health and Welfare
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Greensheet is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Health and Welfare, 28 Pac. L. J. 873 (1997).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol28/iss3/18
Health and Welfare
Chapter 1014: The Use of Financial Incentives to Induce Doctors
to Deny Patients Needed Medical Services
David E. Haddock
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a health care crisis in America. More money per capita is spent on health
care in the United States than in any other country.' Yet at least fifteen percent of the
population, more than in any other developed nation, remains uninsured. According
to analysts, the aging "baby boom" generation may push per capita health care
spending three and one-half times higher than current levels by the year 2030
Perhaps the biggest cause of the explosion in health care spending, and certainly
the cause that has received the most attention, is waste. Robert Brook, director of
health sciences research for the Rand Corporation, has suggested that as much as
one-third of American health care spending may be unnecessary. For example, a
study of California patients concluded that, of 300 coronary bypass procedures,
barely a majority were clearly justified.5 If this finding held true for the rest of the
country, where 350,000 bypasses were performed in 1990, unnecessary treatment
could have enormous costs indeed.6
One of the most promising approaches to eliminating the waste associated with
unnecessary treatment is "managed care." Managed care includes several types of
prepaid health care plans, such as health maintenance organizations (lIMOs) and pre-
ferred provider organizations, whose primary objective is to provide equal or better
benefits while cutting out wasteful spending. In order to eliminate waste, managed
care insurers typically employ a primary care physician, called a "gatekeeper," who
has the responsibility for coordinating the treatment of patients! In a managed care
system, patients are only referred to costly specialists, or admitted to hospitals, when
the gatekeeper determines such a referral to be medically necessary?
1. Lee Smith, A Curefor WhatAils Medical Care, FORTUNE, July 1, 1991, at 44.
2. Id.
3. Boomers to Face Higher Health Costs, SAN DIEMO UNION-TRIB., May 19, 1996, at 13.
4. Smith, supra note 1, at 44.
5. Id.; see id. (discussing a Rand study of patients who had undergone bypasses at several California
hospitals).
6. See id. (noting that $14 billion worth of bypasses were performed nationwide).




Some evidence exists that this approach is succeeding. In 1995, despite an over-
all increase in health care costs, the cost of HMO health benefits decreased by nearly
four percent. 10 Managed care plans have also been able to trim costs by reducing the
number of patients sent to hospitals by almost one-third."
Many health plans use "capitation" payments that reward their frugal doctors.12
In a capitation system, health insurance companies pay doctors a fixed monthly sum
for each patient in their care.' 3 If patients tend to remain healthy, and physicians keep
costs down, the capitation payment represents a significant profit for the doctor,
because the doctor does not have to provide many costly services.' 4 However, treat-
ments for sick patients can be so expensive that, after paying all the bills, little is left
to compensate doctors. 5 Because sixty percent of health plans hold doctors partially
responsible for the cost of caring for sick patients, doctors can often make more
money by limiting expensive treatments. 6
Some insurers offer more direct incentives. For example, some health plans give
bonuses to the physicians who make the fewest number of referrals to specialists, or
who limit most significantly the number of days their patients spend in hospitals. 17
Many insurers will withhold part of a physician's compensation, and will give it to
the physician only if certain cost-containment guidelines are met. 8 According to one
report, this type of incentive is not uncommon. In a study of 108 managed care com-
panies nationwide, Mathematica Policy Research reported that fifty-seven percent of
managed care plans consider "utilization rates and costs" when awarding bonuses
and withholding payment penalties. 19
Despite the success of these programs at lowering costs, observers are concerned
that financial incentives to avoid waste also encourage doctors to withhold needed
10. Ronald Kotulak& Peter Gomer, Medicine Aches with HMO Fever, Un. TRB., Apr. 14, 1996, at 1.
11. Id.
12. See Susan Brink, How Your HMO Could Hurt You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 62
(reporting that 56% of independent practice associations, 34% of group or staff HMOs, and 7% of preferred
provider organizations use capitation as the main method of paying doctors).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see id. (noting that, in 1989, one California physicians' group received only $27.94 per month as
payment for treating a patient whose medical needs cost thousands of dollars more).
16. Id.; see id. (reporting that one survey revealed that 84% of independent practice associations, 68% of
HMOs. and 10% of preferred provider organizations held doctors partially responsible for some portion of
expenses).
17. Karen Cheney, What You Can Learn from an M.D.: Mutiny in a Managed Care Plan, MONEY, Dec. 1,
1995, at 21; see id. (describing the financial incentives offered to physicians by Intergroup, an Arizona company
owned by Foundation Health of Sacramento).
18. SENATE RULES CoMMiTEE, COMXwIE ANALYSIS OF AB 2649, at 4 (Aug. 29, 1996); see id.
(identifying "withholds" as one type of financial incentive used by managed care health plans); Merline, supra note
7, at Al (eiiplaining that some managed care health plans provide financial incentives to limit care by withholding
part of the doctor's salary until the doctor meets the plan's goals).
19. Fiscal Incentives Get Doctors to Limit Care, AM. HEALTH LINE, Dec. 21, 1995, at 13.
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services.2° Congressional Representative Bernie Sanders echoes this view: 'Many
HMOs use what are essentially 'fee-for-denying-service' systems, which pay doctors
for denying care and penalize them for providing it."'
In an effort to ensure that cost containment does not lead to the denial of needed
treatment, several state legislatures have considered bills that would prohibit health
plans from offering financial incentives to encourage doctors to deny necessary
medical services. California's Chapter 1014 shares these objectives
Does the cost-cutting zeal that accompanies managed care really contribute to the
under utilization of medical services? If so, how does Chapter 1014 address this
problem? How effective will Chapter 1014 be at assuring that patients are not denied
needed medical services because of financial incentives? This Legislative Note will
address each of these questions.
I1. Do FINANCIAL INCENTIVES LEAD TO UNDER UTILIZATION?
Are the cost savings of managed care achieved by denying patients needed treat-
ment? Some critics say yes.24 Merrill Matthews, director of the Center for Health
Policy Studies, claims that "[m]anaged care can succeed in lowering health-care costs
only to the extent that it succeeds in preventing patients from obtaining all the
services it is in the patients' self-interest to obtain when the price is zero." 5 Thus,
industry observers maintain that the goals of eliminating waste and lowering costs
can only be reached by withholding needed and appropriate care. According to
20. See Kotulak & Gomer, supra note 10, at I (explaining that, "[iln the short run [patients] may be denied
treatments and therapies they need because of expense"); Merline, supra note 7, at Al (reporting University of
Southern California physician and economist William Schwartz's view that long-term health care costs can be
controlled only by denying patients useful services).
21. 142 CONG. REc. E562-04 (Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Sanders); see Milt Freudenheim, Managed
Care's Cost-Trimming Starts Backlash, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 19, 1996, at Al (describing the efforts of
at least 34 state legislatures to outlaw methods that some HMOs use to shorten hospital stays and keep patients
uninformed regarding incentive programs that may limit care). Representative Sanders has introduced The
Hippocratic Oath & Patient Protection Act in an effort to eliminate what he feels are harmful incentives to limit
needed care. 126 CONG. REC. E562-04 (Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Sanders).
22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-48-3 (Supp. 1996) (preventing health plans from penalizing physicians who
order medical care, and prohibiting health plans from offering any financial incentive or disincentive to anyone for
encouraging or causing the early discharge of a hospital patient from postpartum care); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-6
(1996) (preventing any managed care plan from using a financial incentive program that compensates doctors for
providing less than medically necessary care); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-4:2 (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting managed
care insurers from entering into any "exclusive arrangement," which is defined to include any agreement between
a managed care insurer and a person that has the purpose or the effect of providing financial incentives to restrict
treatment or financial disincentives for failing to restrict treatment); see also Freudenheim, supra note 21, at Al
(describing the efforts of numerous state legislatures to outlaw some tactics for shortening hospital stays and
keeping patients uninformed).
23. See ASSEMBLY COMMI-rEE ON HEALTH, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2649, at 3 (May 7, 1996)
(suggesting that Chapter 1014 was proposed in order to address the concerns of those who fear that efforts to avoid
over utilization of medical services could lead to under utilization).
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (reporting the claims of some industry observers).
25. Merline, supra note 7, at Al.
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William Schwartz, a physician and economist at the University of Southern
California, "[n]either managed care nor fee-for-service providers will be able to
control the long-term rise in costs except by denying some patients access to certain
types of expensive but useful services."26
There are many approaches to limiting costs. Sometimes HMOs will deny access
to expensive services by failing to tell the patient about treatment options.27 In other
cases, HMOs will simply delay needed treatment by weeks or months. Perhaps
most disturbing is when managed care providers shorten or eliminate hospital stays,
or minimize referrals to specialists.29
Surprisingly, doctors who withhold needed medical services can often be
rewarded for the practice through the use of financial incentives. J.B. Silvers, director
of the Health Systems Management Center at Case Western Reserve University,
claims that financial incentives are important tools for encouraging doctors to reduce
costs: "When people start doing tough discounting the)' have to crank down utili-
zation. Use of (financial incentives) is one tool in the arsenals that's not going to go
away."0 According to Silvers, the right economic incentives ensure that doctors will
"perform properly" by focusing on quality and preventative care, including
immunizations, Pap smears, and mammograms.3' However, as Silvers admits, the
wrong incentives could discourage physicians from making needed referrals or
conducting important tests.3
Are doctors, Hippocratic oaths and all, really willing to risk the health of patients
in pursuit of fat paychecks? Perhaps not. While it may be unlikely that doctors
generally are so unscrupulous that they would intentionally endanger patients' lives,
even the most moral physicians may be susceptible to the power of money in shifting
the benefit of the doubt. As Dr. Arnold Relman, nephrologist and editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine, explains, "Like anybody else, a cardiac surgeon wants
to maintain his income." 33 Accordingly, it is in the borderline cases that financial
factors may have the most influence.t In the past, when doctors were paid for each
service they performed, it was more likely that questions as to whether a patient
26. Id. (quoting from Schwartz's article in the journal Health Affairs).
27. U.; see itL (citing a report from the National Kidney Cancer Foundation claiming that HMO doctors will
sometimes fail to disclose treatment options, or will offer "second opinions" from physicians within the same
department, rather than authorize a patient to go outside the physician group).
28. See id. (reporting findings of both Investor's Business Daily and a Medicare Advocacy Project study
showing that managed care doctors sometimes delay needed treatment). The Health Care Financing Administration
has also found examples of Florida HMOs delaying care and failing to act on test results. Id.
29. See Cheney, supra note 17, at 21 (claiming that "[sitrong financial incentives exist to keep down
referrals and shorten hospital stays").
30. Raquel Santiago, Use of Physician Bonuses Gaining Popularity, CRAIN'S CLEVELAND Bus., Oct. 2,
1995, at 43 (alteration in original); see id. (explaining the importance of financial incentives in lowering costs).
31. Id.
32. Id.; see id. (discussing the hazards of financial incentives that provide too much compensation).
33. Smith, supra note 1, at 44.
34. See ia- (claiming that finances can be a factor in the borderline cases).
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really needed a particular treatment would be resolved in favor of over utilization;
the patient got the benefit of the doubt.35 In such cases, over treatment protected the
patient's health, and rewarded the doctor with more fees. 6 In a managed care system,
it is more likely that the benefit of the doubt will be shifted to the insurer. Because
financial incentives now reward doctors for avoiding expensive treatments, some
doctors may be unwilling to risk their monthly bonuses over a treatment that may or
may not be helpful.37
However, despite decreases in the cost of managed care, and claims that health-
care costs can only be trimmed by denying needed services, there is no evidence that
patients in managed care health plans receive inferior treatment.38 For example, the
Journal of the American Medical Association reported that, in a recent study, patients
with high blood pressure or diabetes had equivalent outcomes whether they were
enrolled in traditional fee-for-service plans or HMOs?9 Likewise, although partici-
pants in managed care health plans tend to be less satisfied than participants in fee-
for-service health plans, patients in managed care plans consider themselves as
healthy as do fee-for-service users.4 Accordingly, even if financial incentives do
encourage doctors to deny services, the incentives may not be bad as long as they do
not adversely affect the health of patients. Nevertheless, as the very idea of incentives
35. See Kay Stewart, Bad Medicine, CouRIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 1,1994, at 6A (claiming that giving
patients the benefit of the doubt leads physicians to over prescribe); see also Merline, supra note 7, at Al (noting
that in traditional fee-for-service arrangements, where patients pay little out of pocket, the system encourages them
to over consume and to be indifferent to the cost of health care); Smith, supra note 1, at 44 (explaining that in a
1990 study, 14% of patients who had bypass surgery could have forgone surgery and would have survived as well
with drugs, 30% were borderline, and barely a majority of the patients' conditions clearly justified surgery).
36. See Brink, supra note 12, at 62 (explaining that, while in the past doctors made money when they
provided care, now when they order a hospital stay or a referral to an expensive specialist, they stand to lose
money); Merline, supra note 7, at Al (noting that traditional fee-for-service arrangements encourage over
consumption).
37. See Merline, supra note 7, at Al (citing a report from the American Medical Association claiming that
financial incentives "may erode patient trust as patients wonder whether they are receiving all necessary care or are
being denied care because of the physician's pecuniary concern"); Paul C. Roberts, Health-Care Plan Would Pit
Budget Against Patients, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Jan. 29, 1994, at 58A (claiming that borderline
cases no longer get the benefit of the doubt); id. (suggesting that in HMOs, budgetary considerations prevail over
patient care); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between managed care and
care under traditional fee-for-service systems).
38. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reporting that the cost of HMO health care has declined,
despite an increase in the cost of health care generally); supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing
claims by industry analysts that the cost of health care can only be decreased by denying patients needed services).
39. Brink, supra note 12, at 62 (repeating the findings of the study as reported in the November 8, 1995
Journal ofthe American Medical Association).
40. See Karen Davis et al., Managed Care on the March: Choice Matters for Consumers, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1995, at 99, 103-04 (describing the results of a survey of patients in managed care and fee-for-service
settings which showed that, although managed care patients claim less satisfaction and quality of care than fee-for-
service members, the reported health status of managed care participants and fee-for-service patients does not
differ). In responding to the survey, equivalent numbers of managed care members (89%) and fee-for-service
members (91%) described their own health as either excellent or good. Id. at 102. Similar percentages of managed
care (22%) and fee-for-service (23%) members had immediate family that had what they considered to be a serious
illness requiring extensive medical care within the past year. Id. at 103.
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concedes, ultimately doctors control patient's access to medical services. 4' Whether
or not most physicians are likely to take this approach, financial incentives provide
a reason for the rare unscrupulous doctor to withhold needed treatment in the pursuit
of money.
Em. CHAPTER 1014's APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
OF FRNANCIAL INCENTWES
The California Legislature has addressed the potential problems associated with
financial incentives by enacting Chapter 1014.42 Chapter 1014 prohibits contracts
between doctors and health care service plans, as well as subcontracts between
doctors and other doctors, from containing any "incentive plan" that includes
"specific payments" of any kind made to doctors "as an inducement to deny, reduce,
limit, or delay specific, medically necessary, and appropriate services. '43 Chapter
1014 explicitly excludes from its reach contracts and subcontracts that contain in-
centive plans that involve general payments, such as capitation payments, that are not
related to specific enrollees or groups of enrollees with similar medical conditions."
Although Chapter 1014 seems to provide patients protection from insurers who
are more concerned about finances than health care, upon closer examination it is un-
clear what the enacted statutes really cover. For example, the language only refers
to "incentive plans" that are actually contained in contracts or subcontracts. 45
Presumably, Chapter 1014 would not reach incentives that are not mentioned in con-
tracts. Likewise, incentives that are not considered part of "incentive plans," but are
perhaps more spontaneous rewards for frugality, may not be proscribed. This
limitation may provide a loophole through which health care plans may be able to
induce physicians to deny needed but expensive services using bonuses that are not
part of contracted compensation.
41. By offering doctors financial incentives to perform a certain way, health insurers are implicitly admitting
that doctors are free to behave differently.
42. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 511 (enacted by Chapter 1014), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6
(enacted bit Chapter 1014); id. § 1367.10 (amended by Chapter 1014); CAL. INS. CODE § 10175.5 (enacted by
Chapter 1014).
43. CAL. BUs. &PROF. CODE § 51 l(a) (enacted by Chapter 1014); see id. (applying to subcontracts between
doctors and other doctors), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6(a) (enacted by Chapter 1014) (applying to
contracts between doctors and health care service plans). Although, for simplicity, this discussion will only refer
to incentive payments that encourage doctors to deny services, Chapter 1014 also forbids payments that induce
doctors to reduce, limit, or delay services. Each of the points made applies equally to incentive payments that deny
services anl to payments that reduce, limit, or delay services.
44. CAL- BUS. & PROF. CODE § 511(b) (enacted by Chapter 1014); see id. (forbidding incentives in
subcontracts between doctors and other doctors); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6(b) (enacted by Chapter
1014) (forbidding incentives in contracts between doctors and health care service plans).
45. See C.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 51 1(a) (enacted by Chapter 1014) (prohibiting financial incentives in
subcontracts between doctors and other doctors); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6(a) (enacted by Chapter
1014) (prohibiting financial incentives in contracts between doctors and health care service plans). The language'
in question is identical in both of these sections.
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Chapter 1014 may also be limited insofar as it only applies to a "specific pay-
ment" made "as an inducement" to deny services." This language seems to focus on
the purpose of the payment, only forbidding payments that are specifically intended
to encourage doctors to deny services. Would Chapter 1014 ban payments that have
multiple purposes, only one of which is to encourage doctors to deny services? Does
Chapter 1014 apply to payments that have legitimate purposes, but coincidentally
have the effect of encouraging doctors to deny services? Chapter 1014 itself does not
answer these questions.
Because Chapter 1014 focuses on the purpose of the incentive payments, rather
than on the effect of the payments, it may overlook harmful incentives. For example,
Chapter 1014 only prohibits contracts from containing "any incentive plan that
includes a specific payment made.., as an inducement to deny... services."47 If a
health care plan adopts compensation schemes for other purposes, those schemes
may escape Chapter 1014's prohibition, even if they have the effect of encouraging
doctors to withhold needed care. For example, although thirty-seven percent of
managed care companies nationwide compensate their doctors with capitation pay-
ments,48 managed care companies insist that those payments are not intended to
induce doctors to deny needed care.49
Should capitation payments be overlooked by Chapter 1014 simply because they
are only intended to compensate doctors for performing their regular duties? To over-
look them is to ignore their enormous persuasive power. As one critic explained,
using capitation payments is like giving doctors a pile of money and telling them that
they can keep anything they don't spend.5° Certainly payments like these can have
the effect of encouraging doctors to deny necessary care, even if the purpose for the
payments is more legitimate.5' Like capitation payments, bonuses and withholds can
have similar effects, despite their purposes.5 2
Even though the language of Chapter 1014 probably would not apply to
capitation payments, Chapter 1014 contains a provision explicitly exempting in-
centive plans that include general payments, like capitation payments, that are not
46. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 511(b) (enacted by Chapter 1014) (subcontracts between doctors and other
doctors); CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1348.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 1014) (health care service plan contracts
with doctors).
47. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 511(a) (enacted by Chapter 1014) (subcontracts between doctors); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6(a) (enacted by Chapter 1014) (contracts between doctors and health care service
plans). The language in question is identical in both of these sections.
48. See Fiscal Incentives Get Doctors to Limit Care, supra note 19, at 13 (reporting the findings of research
conducted by Mathematica Policy Research).
49. See Freudenheim, supra note 21, at Al (noting that managed care companies claim that capitation is not
designed to deny necessary treatment).
50. Fiscal Incentives Get Doctors to Limit Care, supra note 19, at 13 (quoting Dr. Steffie Woolhandler, who
wrote an editorial on the subject of financial incentives in the New England Journal of Medicine).
51. See U (reciting Dr. David Himmeistein's claim that because of capitation payments, "doctors are getting
offered big financial rewards for denying care").
52. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing other compensation plans such as bonuses
and withholds).
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tied to the denial of specific treatments.53 Because capitation payments encourage
doctors to deny necessary care, and because they are so common, by exempting them
from the prohibition of Chapter 1014 the legislature has neglected to curtail a signi-
ficant method for denying patients necessary and appropriate care.MAccordingly, the
legislature's attempt, through Chapter 1014, to prohibit incentive plans that limit
necessary medical care seems less than sincere.
Another problem is that Chapter 1014 only forbids payments that encourage the
denial of services that are both "specific, medically necessary, and appropriate.""
Since the language of Chapter 1014 does not include a list or even describe the types
of "specific" services that cannot be denied due to incentives, the meaning of that
phrase is unclear. How can the medical services be "specific?" Is Chapter 1014 pro-
hibiting contracts from specifying particular medical services that doctors must deny?
Or rather, does Chapter 1014 forbid only incentives that deny services that are
specifically listed somewhere and are also medically necessary and appropriate?
Again, Chapter 1014 itself does not explain this confusion. If the denied services
must be specified in the contract for Chapter 1014 to apply, Chapter 1014 is a very
weak protection indeed. Presumably, such a rule would allow doctors to receive
financial incentives to deny medically necessary and appropriate services as long as
those services are not enumerated in the contract. Nevertheless, whether this or some
other interpretation is correct is unclear.
The most significant provision of Chapter 1014 is the disclosure requirement.56
Chapter 1014 requires that every health care service plan that will affect the patient's
choice of doctor or hospital clearly describe the ways participation in the plan may
affect the choice of physicians or hospitals, the basic methods of reimbursement, and
whether financial bonuses or incentives are usedY Chapter 1014 further requires that
information given to prospective enrollees include, conspicuously, the following
statement: "Please read the following information so you will know from whom or
what group of providers health care may be obtained." 58
53. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 511(b) (enacted by Chapter 1014) (prohibiting such payments from
being mentioned in subcontracts between doctors and other doctors); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6(b)
(enacted by Chapter 1014) (forbidding such payments from being mentioned in contracts between doctors and
health care service plans).
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of capitation payments as in incentive
to deny needed medical care); see also Fiscal Incentives Get Doctors to Limit Care, supra note 19, at 13 (noting
that 37% of American managed care companies use capitation payments).
55. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 511(b) (enacted by Chapter 1014) (prohibiting such payments from
being mentioned in subcontracts between doctors and other doctors); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6(b)
(enacted by Chapter 1014) (forbidding such payments from being mentioned in contracts between doctors and
health care service plans).
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Significantly, the disclosure requirement only applies to health care service plans
"that will affect the choice of physician, hospital, or other health care providers." 9
Chapter 1014 does not require health care plans that do not affect such choices to
disclose the basic methods of reimbursement or the existence of financial bonuses
or incentives.6 Still, by requiring health care providers to disclose to prospective
enrollees whether financial bonuses or incentives are used in compensating doctors,
Chapter 1014 empowers consumers with the information they need to effectively
shop for the best health care. Consumers can know, before they enroll, whether their
doctor will be paid to limit access to specialists, or to minimize days spent in
hospitals, or to deny treatments that they may or may not need. Thus, even if Chapter
1014 is ineffective at eliminating financial incentives that encourage doctors to deny
necessary care, California consumers can avoid such incentives by choosing a health
care plan that does not use them.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the health care industry strives to reduce costs, health insurance plans are
rewarding doctors for limiting waste.61 However, critics fear that efforts to reduce
waste are having such a strong effect that they are going too far.62 Some doctors are
being rewarded for denying patients needed and appropriate care.63 Chapter 1014 is
California's attempt to ensure that doctors do not get paid for limiting access to
treatment that patient's really need.
However, since the language of Chapter 1014 is so limiting and so unclear, the
law may not have its desired effect. Because it forbids only incentives that are men-
tioned in contracts, it will have no effect on less formal incentive plans." Because
Chapter 1014 prohibits only payments made for the specific purpose of inducing the
denial of treatment, it ignores incentive plans that may have multiple, or hidden,
purposes, and it neglects plans, such as those involving capitation payments, that may
have legitimate purposes but harmful effects. s Chapter 1014 even explicitly exempts
capitation plans from its prohibitions.M
Thankfully, Chapter 1014 also requires health care plans that affect the patient's
choice of a doctor or a hospital to disclose to potential enrollees whether the plan
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text (discussing incentives for limiting waste).
62. See supra notes 20-21, 24-26 and accompanying text (noting the views of some industry observers).
63. See supra notes 20-21, 24-26 and accompanying text (noting the views of some industry observers).
64. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (examining Chapter 1014's limitation to incentives that are
mentioned in contracts).
65. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (addressing ambiguities in the language of Chapter 1014).
66. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (considering the exemption of capitation payments from
the application of Chapter 1014).
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uses bonuses or incentives in compensating doctors.67 This provision ensures that
even if Chapter 1014 does not eliminate financial incentives by its own terms,
California consumers will still have the ability to choose health plans and doctors that
are more concerned with the health of patients than their own wallets.
APPENDIX
Code Sections Affected
Business and Professions Code § 511 (new); Health and Safety Code §
1348.6 (new), § 1367.10 (amended); Insurance Code § 10175.5 (new).
AB 2649 (Thompson, Figueroa, Sweeney); 1996 STAT. ch. 1014
67. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing Chapter 1014's disclosure requirement).
68. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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In 1990, the federal government passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), which guarantees equal access rights for disabled persons t Prior to the
passage of the ADA, California adopted statutes dealing with disabled access.2 The
legislature amended these laws and added other laws subsequent to the passage of
federal law.3 Chapter 498 makes various technical amendments to improve existing
California law.4 This Legislative Note will first review the changes in California law
made by Chapter 498,5 and then will examine the politics, controversy, and possible
problems the Chapter may encounter.6
IH. AMENDMENTS
A. Public Places
Existing law provides that persons with disabilities7 have the same rights as the
general public to full and free use of public places! Chapter 498 makes a violation
of the ADA a violation of existing California law!
1. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995).
2. See, e.g., 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Stat. ch. 1257, secs. 1-4, at 4-8 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § § 54-54.3)
(providing equal access rights to disabled individuals in various contexts); id. sec. 11, at 10-I1 (amending CAL.
PENAL CODE § 365.5) (making the denial of a disabled individual's equal access rights a misdemeanor).
3. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 54-54.3 (amended by Chapter 498) (enumerating the rights of disabled persons
to equal access in various contexts); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12948 (amended by Chapter 498) (same); CAL PENAL
CODE § 365.5 (amended by Chapter 498) (same).
4. See Telephone Interview with Joan Riddle, Legislative Consultant on SB 1687 to Senator Milton Marks
(June 21. 1996) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that Chapter 498 is a "clean-up" bill making
necessary technical changes to existing law).
5. See infra Part H.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See CAL Civ. CODE § 54(b) (amended by Chapter 498) (defining "disability" as any of the following:
"(1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the
individual[,] (2) a record of such an impairment[,] or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment").
8. Id. § 54(a) (amended by Chapter 498) (specifying such public places as streets, highways, sidewalks,
walkways, public buildings, medical facilities, public facilities, and other public places).
9. Id. § 54(c) (amended by Chapter 498).
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B. Housing, Transportation, Facilities, and Accommodations
California law states that disabled persons shall be entitled to full and equal
access 0 to transportation, accommodations, "and facilities. 'Jnder existing law,
refusing access to an individual because he or she uses an assistance dog13constitutes
a denial of that person's right to equal access.14 In addition, persons licensed to train
dogs for disabled persons have the right to be accompanied by either a guide dog,
signal dog, or service dog in any place specified in Civil Code § 54.1.15 California
law also prohibits persons from charging disabled persons or trainers of assistance
dogs extra money for the admission of the assistance dog.' 6 Persons accompanied by
such a dog must have the dog on a leash and have the dog tagged 7 identifying the
dog as a guide dog, signal dog, or service dog.'8 People accompanied by these dogs
will be liable for all damage caused by the dogs.' 9 Chapter 498 makes a violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act a violation of California law.20
Prior California law declared it an unlawful practice "for a person to deny or to
aid, incite, or conspire in the denial of the rights created by section 51 or 51.7 of the
10. See id. § 54.1(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 498) (defining "full and equal access" with respect to
transportation as that required under Titles II and III of the ADA and federal regulations adopted in furtherance of
the ADA); id. (further providing that if California law mandates higher standards, those standards shall apply).
11. See id. § 54.1(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 498) (defining "housing accommodations" as "any real
property, or portion thereof, which is used or occupied, or is intended, arranged, or designed to be used or occupied,
as a home, residence, or sleeping place of one or more human beings"); id. (excluding from the definition of
housing accommodations those accommodations set forth in § 54.1(a) and any single family residence in which
the occupants rent, lease, or furnish not more than one room); see also id. § 54.1(a) (amended by Chapter 498)
(listing the following accommodations: airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motorbuses, streetcars, boats, or
any other public transportation, telephone facilities, hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation,
amusement, or resort, and other public places).
12. Id. § 54.1(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 498); see id. (including accommodations, facilities, mcdical
facilities, and common carriers as places to which disabled individuals are entitled to full and equal access, but not
limiting equal access rights to these places).
13. See id. § 54.1(b)(6)(C)(i) (amended by Chapter 498) (defining a "guide dog" as any dog that was trained
by a person licensed under Chapter 9.5 of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code or as defined by the
ADA); id. § 54.l(b)(6)(C)(ii) (amended by Chapter 498) (defining a "signal dog" as a dog trained to alert a deaf
or hearing impaired individual to intruders or sounds); id.§ 54.1(bX6)(C)(iii) (amended by Chapter 498) (defining
a "service dog" as any dog individually trained to the requirements of a disabled person, including fetching items,
protecting, and pulling wheelchairs).
14. Id. § 54.1(b)(6)(A) (amended by Chapter 498).
15. Id. § 54.2(b) (amended by Chapter 498).
16. Id. § 54.2 (amended by Chapter 493).
17. See CAL. FooD & AGRIC. CODE § 30850 (amended by Chapter 498) (stating that such tags shall be
issued by the county clerk or animal control department).
18. CAL. Civ. CODE § 54.2(b) (amended by Chapter 498).
19. Id. § 54.2 (amended by Chapter 493).
20. Id. §§ 54.1-54.2 (amended by Chapter498).
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Civil Code. ' 21 Chapter 498 amends prior law by adding §§ 54, 54.1, and 54.2 of the
Civil Code to this list of unlawful practices.22
C. Dog Tag Requirements
Chapter 498 changes several aspects regarding the tags assistance dogs are
required to wear.23 First, existing law requires the tags to be of uniform shape, size,
and color statewide as determined by the Department of Food and Agriculture in con-
sultation with the State Department of Health Services.24 Ordinarily, adoption of
regulations must adhere to the administrative procedures specified in Chapter 3.5
(commencing with § 11340), Division 3 of Part 1 of Title 2 of the Government
Code.25 This process requires, among other things, public notice, hearings, and
review in order to adopt a new regulation.26 Chapter 498 exempts the decision
regarding the uniform statewide appearance of the assistance dog tags from these
requirements.27 This change saves the Department of Food and Agriculture from
incurring the ordinary expenses involved in adopting administrative regulations.2
Second, Chapter 498 adds a new element in the context of the assistance dog
tags, by providing that nothing in the chapter regarding the assistance dog tags shall
be construed to limit the ADA. 9 This provision was added to make this chapter
consistent with §§ 54 through 54.2 of the Civil Code, which already provide that
nothing in existing law shall be construed to limit the ADA.3° Chapter 498 further
states that the provisions in the Chapter dealing with assistance dog tags are
severable should they conflict with the ADA. 31 Thus, should the courts find that part
of Chapter 498 conflicts with the ADA, those portions of the Chapter that do not
conflict will stand on their own.
21. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 992, sec. 4, at 3154 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12948); see CAL. Civ. CODE § 51
(West Supp. 1997) (stating that persons have equal rights regardless of their sex, race, color, ancestry, or national
origin); id. § 51.7 (West Supp. 1997S (declaring that all persons in California have the right to be free of violence
and/or intimidation against themselves or their property because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
political affiliation, or position in a labor dispute).
22. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12948 (amended by Chapter 498); see CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 54-54.2 (amended by
Chapter 498) (enumerating the rights of disabled persons to equal access in various contexts).
23. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 54.2(b) (amended by Chapter 498) (requiring assistance dogs to be tagged).
24. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 30852 (amended by Chapter 498).
25. CAL GOV'TCODE §§ 11340-11356 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997) (specifying procedures to follow when
adopting administrative regulations).
26. See, e.g., CAL GOV'TCODE § 11346.5 (West Supp. 1996) (specifying, at length, the notice requirements
that must be followed prior to hearings and adoption of a regulation); id. § 11346.8 (West Supp. 1997) (articulating
procedural requirements for public hearings regarding the regulation); id. § 11349.1 (West Supp. 1997) (providing
standards by which the adopted regulation shall be reviewed).
27. CAL FOOD & AGRIc. CODE § 30852(b) (amended by Chapter 498).
28. Telephone Interview with Joan Riddle, supra note 4.
29. CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE § 30853 (enacted by Chapter 498).
30. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 54-54.2 (amended by Chapter 498).
31. CAL FOOD & AORIc. CODE § 30854 (enacted by Chapter 498).
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Third, Chapter 498 adopts certain procedural provisions in an effort to prevent
fraud. Chapter 498 requires a person applying for assistance dog tags to sign an
affidavit declaring that the individual understands California Penal Code § 365.5.32
Chapter 498 also directs an individual to return assistance dog tags immediately upon
the death or retirement of the assistance dog.33 Prevention of fraud underlies the pur-
pose of these specific amendments. 34 The drafters of Chapter 498 hope that these pro-
visions will eliminate the fraud problem experienced under past law? 5
California is one of the only states that requires tags that identify a dog as an
assistance dog. 6 More importantly, federal law does not require assistance dog
tags.37 Accordingly, requiring assistance dog tags could be construed as a violation
of federal law.38 Chapter 498 amends prior California law to guarantee access
equivalent to that provided by the ADA and the Air Carrier Access Act of 198639 in
order to rectify this discrepancy. 40 Thus, Chapter 498 aims to avoid a conflict with
federal law.
32. Id. § 30850(b) (enacted by Chapter 498); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 365.5 (amended by Chapter 498)
(prohibiting any person from fraudulently or knowingly representing himself or herself as an owner or trainer of
an assistance dog and providing that a violation of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by a jail term not to
exceed six months and/or a $1000 fine).
33. CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE § 30850(c) (amended by Chapter 498).
34. See Telephone Interview with Joan Riddle supra note 4 (stating that problems with fraud existed before
the passage of Chapter 498).
35. Id.
36. Memorandum from Senator Milton Marks to Legislative Counsel (Jan. 16, 1996) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal). Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a) (West 1995) (requiring a disabled individual
to outfit his or her guide dog with either a harness or an orange colored leash) (emphasis added) and FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 413.08 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (providing that the guide dog or service dog must be capable of being
identified as such a dog) with ALA. CODE § 21-7-9(d) (1990) (providing that disabled individuals are entitled to
equal access with their assistance dog but failing to require tags identifying such dogs as assistance dogs); DEL.
CODEANN. tit. 16, § 9505(d) (1995) (same); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1702(b) (1995) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-4-
2(c) (1993) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-6-5 (West Supp. 1996) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1312(3)
(West Supp. 1996) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256C.025(4) (West 1992) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 209.190(4)
(West 1996) (same); MONT. CODEANN. § 494-214 (1995) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167-C:2 (1994) (same);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-7-104(d) (1993) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. 9 26-30-2(1) (1995) (same); and VA. CODE ANN.
§ 51.5-45(.B) (Michie 1994) (same).
37. Telephone Interview with Joan Riddle, supra note 4; see 42 U.S.C.A. 9§ 12101-12213 (West 1990)
(failing to require dog tags identifying dogs as assistance dogs); 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 (West Supp. 1996)
(same).
38. Memorandum from Senator Milton Marks, supra note 36; see supra note 36 (listing other state laws
which do not require tags identifying dogs as assistance dogs); infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing
how California law may conflict with federal law).
39. See 49 U.S.C.A.. §§ 1301-1542 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons).
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 365.5(gX2) (amended by Chapter 498).
41. Memorandum from Senator Milton Marks, supra note 36.
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D. Remedies
Existing law provides remedies for violations of § 54 through § 54.2 of the Civil
Code.42 Any person who interferes with a disabled person's rights enumerated in the
above referenced sections can be sued in civil court and be held liable for up to three
times the actual damages.43 California used to specify minimum damages of $750
plus attorney's fees for a violation of these sections.44 Chapter 498 raises the mini-
mum recovery to $1000. 45 Further, Chapter 498 creates an administrative remedy by
authorizing the filing of verified complaints with the Department of Fair Employ-
ment and Housing. 6 The administrative remedy provides injunctions or equitable
relief, the sale or rental of like property, the payment of a civil penalty, or the
payment of actual damages.47 It was added to provide administrative oversight and
to provide claimants with a choice regarding which type of action they seek."
Moreover, any person who interferes with or prevents a disabled person from
exercising his or her rights is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine
of $2500.49 This criminal penalty does not affect any civil penalties a disabled
individual may seek for a violation of his or her rights.50
Furthermore, Chapter 498 adopts language making the language of California
Penal Code § 365.5 congruent with California Civil Code § 54.1 (c).5 Additionally,
Chapter 498 expressly adds medical facilities, telephone facilities, and adoption
agencies to the list of public places where access shall not be denied to a disabled
person because they are accompanied by an assistance dog.52
H. HISTORY OF EXISTING LAW
In 1994, Senator Marks introduced Senate Bill 124053 because, despite the enact-
ment of the ADA and California law, disabled persons were being denied access to
42. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 54-54.2 (amended by Chapter 498).
43. Id. I 54.3(a) (amended by Chapter 498).
44. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1257, sec. 4, at 6478 (amending CAL CIV. CODE § 54.3).
45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.3(b) (amended by Chapter 498).
46. Id.
47. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12987 (West Supp. 1997).
48. Telephone Interview with Joan Riddle, supra note 4.
49. CAL PENAL CODE § 365.5(c) (amended by Chapter 498).
50. Id. § 365.5(gX) (amended by Chapter 498); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.3 (amended by Chapter 498)
(specifying the type of civil penalties that may be imposed for violating the right to equal access of disabled
persons).
51, Compare CAL PENAL CODE § 365.5 (amended by Chapter 498) (requiring that the person using or
training an assistance dog ensure that the dog is on a leash and tagged properly as a guide dog, service dog, or
signal dog and stating that such person shall be liable for any provable damages to the premises caused by the dog)
with CAL CiV. CODE § 54.1(c) (amended by Chapter 498) (containing the same language added to California Penal
Code § 365.5 by Chapter 498).
52. CAL PENAL CODE § 365.5 (amended by Chapter 498).
53. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1257, sec. 1, at 6475-76.
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public accommodations and facilities because they were accompanied by an
assistance dog.?4 Senate Bill 1240 provided disabled individuals accompanied by
assistance dogs and persons training assistance dogs with equal access to public
facilities and accommodationsO
Although laudable, SB 1240 met opposition from a few interest groups. mGroups
such as the restaurant, hotel, and grocery industries opposed the bill because the bill
did not require assistance dogs to be tagged or identified as assistance dogs. These
industries argued that without a tag identifying a dog as an assistance dog, operators
and employees in these industries would have a hard time distinguishing a pet from
an assistance dog, particularly if the person accompanied by the dog had no visible
disability.53 The restaurant, grocery, and hotel industries were concerned that they
would be forced to admit dogs into their facilities without knowing whether the dogs
were adequately trained as assistance dogs.59 They feared that the admittance of
inadequately trained dogs posed a risk of health and safety violations.!0
The employee base in the restaurant, hotel, and grocery industries enhanced these
legitimate concerns. 6' These industries employ a large number of short-term, low-
skill employees who do not have the requisite knowledge to make decisions re-
garding disabled access laws.62 Thus, employers in these industries felt particularly
exposed to liability due to their employees' general lack of knowledge and skill in
this area.63 Consequently, the legislature added provisions requiring assistance dog
tags in order to accommodate the restaurant, hotel, and grocery industries and ensure
passage of the bill."
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Existing California law requires identification of assistance dogs with special
tags.6 However, the ADA provides equal access for individuals with disabilities, but
does not require tags that identify a dog as an assistance dog.66 Thus, California law
54. ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1240, at 5 (Aug. 10, 1994).
55. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1257. sec. 1, at 6475-76.
56. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1240, at 1 (Aug. 10, 1994).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id.
61. Telephone Interview with Joan Riddle, supra note 4.
62. Id.; see Restaurant Kicks Out Blind Women With Guide Dogs, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at B5
(describing the experience of two blind women who were kicked out of a Burger King restaurant by employees
because of concerns about health code violations, despite the fact that the women showed the employees a card
citing state law that allows a guide dog to accompany a disabled person into a restaurant).
63. Telephone Interview with Joan Riddle, supra note 4.
64. See ASSEMBLY COMMITmEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1240, at 1 (Aug. 10, 1994)
(stating that the bill was amended to require identification tags of assistance dogs).
65. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (requiring assistance dogs to be tagged).
66. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (stating that the ADA does not require assistance dog tags).
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may conflict with federal law. This potential conflict presents two problems with
California's assistance dog tag law.
A. A False Sense of Security
First, California's assistance dog tag requirement may prove to be a trap for the
unwary. For instance, if an individual denies a disabled person access to a public
accommodation or facility because the disabled person's dog is not tagged, he or she
still may be held liable for violating the disabled person's rights. This is because
although California law requires assistance dogs to be tagged, the ADA does not
require tags.67 Thus, a person may still incur liability under federal law for denying
a disabled individual access because his or her dog lacks tags.
Moreover, Chapter 498 provides that the tag requirement under California law
shall not be construed to limit the access provided by the ADA.6 Since the ADA
does not require assistance dog tags, California law, by its own terms, cannot limit
a disabled individual's access based upon this requirement. 69 In addition, Chapter 498
makes a violation of federal law a violation of California law. 0 Accordingly, an
individual who relies on California's dog tag requirement in denying a disabled
individual access may incur liability under both federal and state laws. Thus,
California's dog tag requirement does nothing except pose a greater threat of liability
to the concerned industries because it purports to require dog tags when in essence
it cannot.
B. Supremacy
Second, the ADA may preempt California's assistance dog tag requirement. The
Federal Constitution provides for the supremacy of federal law where federal and
state laws conflict.7 Such a conflict may exist between Chapter 498 and the ADA
given that Chapter 498 requires tags identifying assistance dogs where federal law
does not.72
Congressional intent underlying federal law determines whether federal law
preempts state law. 73 Congress may preempt state law by expressly stating so or by
occupying the field.74 In addition, federal law preempts state law where state law
67. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (stating that the ADA does not require assistance dog tags).
68. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. § 30853 (amended by Chapter 498).
69. See i& (providing that California law shall not be construed to limit access guaranteed under the ADA).
70. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 54-54.2 (amended by Chapter 498) (stating that a violation of the ADA is a
violation of these provisions of state law).
71. See U.S. CoNST. art. VI (providing that federal law is the supreme law of the land).
72. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (stating that California law requires dog tags whereas
federal law does not make such a requirement).
73. California Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272.280 (1987).
74. Id.at280-81.
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directly conflicts with federal law! 5 The ADA expressly allows states to provide
equal or greater protections to disabled individuals! 6 By expressly allowing states
to pass laws of equal or greater force than the ADA, Congress arguably intended to
preempt less stringent state laws. Moreover, congressional intent strongly backs this
inference." Hence, Congress likely intended the ADA to preempt less stringent state
laws.
Congress passed the ADA to ensure equal access for disabled persons but did not
require those utilizing assistance dogs to obtain special dog tags.78 This implies that
Congress did not intend the rights of a disabled individual to hinge on the presence
of identification tags. California's dog tag provisions create an additional hurdle that
disabled individuals must surpass in order to ensure equal access. Thus, federal law
provides more stringent protection because it guarantees equal access to disabled
individuals unconditionally. Therefore, the provisions requiring assistance dog tags
most likely will be stricken if challenged. 9
The drafters of Chapter 498 have provided for this contingency by making all
provisions of this chapter severable.80 Therefore, if any provision of Chapter 498 is
found to conflict with the ADA, other valid provisions of Chapter 498 will not be
affected.81 Hence, the objectives of prior California law and Chapter 498-equal
access for disabled individuals accompanied by their assistance dogs-will be
maintained regardless of the validity of the assistance dog tag requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
What was meant to be a law ensuring equal access for disabled people turned
into an argument pitting proprietors, who were concerned about having dogs in their
establishments, against disabled advocates, who were concerned about equal access
for disabled persons. This argument spawned California's assistance dog tag require-
ments. The legislature enacted Chapter 498 to clean up problems with the existing
75. Id. at 281.
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(b) (West 1995).
77. See id §12101(b) (West 1995) (specifying the intent to: (1) Provide clear and comprehensive national
mandates; (2) provide strong, enforceable standards; (3) ensure the federal government's involvement in enforcing
the standards; and (4) invoke the "sweep" of congressional authority).
78. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (stating that federal law does not require tags for assistance
dogs).
79. See Memorandum from Senator Milton Marks, supra note 36 (stating that the identification tag
requirement could be a violation of federal law and other states' law); see also Telephone Interview with Joan
Riddle, supra note 4 (stating that the provision requiring assistance dog tags is probably a violation of the ADA);
cf Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Hawaii's law requiring a 120-day
quarantine for carnivorous animals violates the ADA, and requiring that the law be modified to comply with the
ADA).
80. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 30854 (enacted by Chapter 498).
81. See id.
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 28
California law. However, in doing so, Chapter 498 presents interesting problems for
those establishments concerned about allowing dogs onto their premises.
The state law dog tag requirements apparently quelled the concerns of the hotel,
grocery, and restaurant industries. However, individuals who deny access to a
disabled person because his or her dog is not properly tagged may incur liability
under both the ADA and California law. Furthermore, the courts will likely strike the
tag requirements because they conflict with federal law. In essence, the tag require-
ments did nothing except mollify the concerns of some powerful industries. Although
in practice the tag requirements arguably do nothing, they enabled the passage of
both prior law and Chapter 498. Thus, clever drafting enabled the furtherance of a
worthy and needed goal-truly equal access for disabled individuals.
APPENDIx
Code Sections Affected
Civil Code §§ 54, 54.1, 54.2, 54.3 (amended); Food and Agricultural Code
§§ 30853, 30854 (new), §§ 30850, 30852 (amended); Government Code §
12948 (amended); Penal Code § 365.5 (amended).
SB 1687 (Marks); 1996 STAT. Ch. 498
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After a jury convicted him of the murder, torture, and sexual assault of fourteen
boys and young men, the public paid William George Bonin $79,000 while awaiting
his execution.' Although federal law prohibits social security benefits from being
paid to persons incarcerated for over thirty days,2 Bonin, better known as the "Free-
way Killer," continued to receive social security benefits while on death row. Public
awareness of this issue, and general resentment toward welfare,4 has prompted state
and federal legislation that would provide better enforcement of the law that prohibits
inmates from receiving welfare funds.5
Allowing inmates to receive welfare benefits is viewed as contrary to the basic
principle of having a welfare system. 6 Specifically, welfare acts as a web of support
programs that provide a disabled and needy population with the necessities of life.7
Taxpayers, through their tax dollars, provide food and housing to incarcerated
1. Marc Lifsher, State Says Federal Officials Let Checks Go to Prisoners, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar.
9, 1996, at A18 [hereinafter Lifsher, Checks Go to Prisoners]; see Man Known as the Freeway Killer Is Executed,
N.Y. TMws, Feb. 24, 1996, at 7 (explaining that a jury convicted Bonin of murdering 14 boys and young men),
2. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(x) (West Supp. 1996) (explaining that individuals shall not be paid benefits for
any month during which they are incarcerated).
3. Marc Lifsher, Alert Didn't Keep Funds from Bonin, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 5, 1996, at B01
[hereinafter Lifsher, Alert Didn't Keep Funds]; see id. (explaining that the "Freeway Killer" received social security
payments throughout the 14 years he was on death row); Lifsher, Checks Go to Prisoners, supra note 1, at AI8
(stating that the "Freeway Killer" received illegal social security benefits while he was on death row). See generally
Man Known as the Freeway Killer Is Executed, supra note 1, at 7 (reporting about the execution of the "Freeway
Killer").
4. See Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al (stating
that President Clinton acknowledges the nation's frustration over welfare).
5. See HR 2320, 104th Cong. (1995) (amending the Social Security Act to require institutions to report
individuals that are confined); see also Lifsher, Alert Didn't Keep Funds, supra note 3, at B01 (reporting that social
security now receives computer reports from approximately 90% of the inmate population); Money for Nothing,
SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRi., Oct. 30, 1995, at B6 (explaining that house member Bob Clement of Tennessee
introduced a new Criminal Welfare Prevention Act to save the government money from prisoners that double-dip).
6. See Nancy Weaver, Check's in the Mail and Jail Inmates Are Cashing In, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 11,
1995, at Al (explaining that inmates receiving welfare payments is illegal because the county already pays for the
meals and shelter).
7. Money for Nothing, supra note 5. at B6; see id. (stating that a portion of social security benefits goes
to help the disabled acquire food, housing, and other necessities); see also Rachel M. Schulman, Welfare Reform:
Fact or Fiction?, 20 SErON HALL LEGiS.J. 169, 170 (1996) (explaining that 75% of the economically disadvantaged
in the United States receive government benefits to aid their daily survival).
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individuals.8 Thus, providing inmates with welfare compensation allows prisoners
to "double-dip" into the public's pocket,9 thereby inhibiting the state's ability to
provide welfare assistance to those that desperately need it. Chapter 205 seeks to end
this abuse by establishing a statewide reporting system that alerts the State Depart-
ment of Social Services of prisoners that have been incarcerated for thirty days. 0
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ideological Shift in Providing Welfare Assistance
The welfare system's goals have changed in recent years." In the past, society
viewed welfare as a means of providing assistance to those who have fell victim to
poverty. 2 Various systems that were created to reform the individual were con-
sidered beneficial to the public and a humanitarian way of providing families with
the necessities of life.13 Today, people view poverty as a personal choice.14 No longer
are welfare recipients considered a group the system should reform, but rather,
society stigmatizes them as a group that seeks out welfare as a way of life. 5 More-
over, critics of the welfare system argue that it allows recipients to become dependent
upon public support, and thus critics call for its elimination. 6
8. Money for Nothing, supra note 5, at B6; see id. (explaining that taxpayers pay for inmates' housing,
food, and medical care during incarceration); see also Weaver, supra note 6, at Al (stating that an inmate's receipt
of welfare while in jail is illegal because the county is already paying for meals and shelter).
9. Money for Nothing, supra note 5, at B6; Weaver, supra note 6, at Al; see Lifsher, Checks Go to
Prisoners, supra note 1, at A18 (quoting the Regional Commissioner of Social Security as stating that illegal
payments to county jail inmates cost the state and federal governments millions of dollars per year).
10. SENAT FLOOR, COMM mrrEANALYSISOPFSB 1556, at 2 (July 9, 1996); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 10985(a) (enacted by Chapter 205) (stating that every jail shall report twice each month to the Department of
Social Services those inmates that the jails have incarcerated for 30 days).
11. Schulman, supra note 7, at 169; see id (explaining that Congress intends to reform the welfare system).
12. Ic at 172-73; see id. (explaining that the goals of welfare used to be to help those that needed assistance,
and to find ways to terminate poverty).
13. See Moneyfor Nothing, supra note 5, at B6 (describing social security as a system that helps disabled
people pay for food, housing, and other necessities).
14. See Schulman, supra note 7, at 175 (stating that during the 1980s, justifications for poverty turned
toward individual choice).
15. See id. at 169 (explaining that Congress thinks of welfare as a dependency web); see also Clines, supra
note 4, at Al (quoting President Clinton's statement that his current welfare reform will prevent welfare from
becoming a way of life).
16. Schulman, supra note 7, at 170; see id. (stating that the elimination of the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program is one of the goals of Congress); see also Clines, supra note 4, at Al (describing
President Clinton's new welfare reform as eliminating a pillar of President Roosevelt's social welfare program).
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B. Prohibiting Prisoners from Receiving Public Funds
For the last sixteen years, the United States Congress has enacted legislation
limiting the ability of inmates to receive social security. 7 The rationale in creating
this legislation was that prisoners do not need to receive welfare compensation be-
cause they are being maintained in prison at public expense.'8 As intolerance toward
inmates receiving compensation grew, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting the
inmates of any public institution from receiving public funds for any month that they
are incarcerated. 9 Moreover, individuals confined at public expense because of a
verdict finding the person mentally incompetent are also prohibited from receiving
public assistance.20 Although constitutional concerns have been raised regarding this
prohibition, these concerns appear to be in vain?'
C. Constitutional Scrutiny of Prohibiting Prisoners' Benefits
Since the time that Congress first prohibited the distribution of public funds to
inmates, many inmates have challenged the prohibition on constitutional grounds.22
However, courts have consistently upheld Congress's power to prohibit inmates from
receiving social security benefitsY3
1. Bill of Attainder
Some inmates have argued that prohibiting their ability to receive welfare bene-
fits violates the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder.2 4 A bill of
17. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (describing legislation that has prohibited the extension
of social security benefits to inmates).
18. Zipkin v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1986).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(x) (West Supp. 1996).
20. id.
21. See, e.g., Sulieov. Bowen, 653 F. Supp. 849, 851 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (stating that the constitutionality of
Social Security Act section 202(x) continues to be upheld in numerous courts); see also infra Parts 1I.C. ., 2.
(discussing cases that have upheld the constitutionality of prohibitions against inmates receiving welfare benefits).
See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of 202(x) of Social Security Act (42
USCS § 402(x)), Mandating Suspension of Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits for Incarcerated
Felons, 86 A.L.R. FED. 748 (1988) (describing cases that have dealt with the constitutionality of section 202(x) of
the Social Security Act).
22. See Sarno, supra note 21, at 753-63 (discussing the various constitutional challenges brought against
section 202(x) of the Social Security Act, including attacks based on double jeopardy, equal protection, and due
process).
23. See infra Parts 1I.C.1., 2. (discussing why courts have upheld statutes that prohibit inmates from
receiving social security benefits).
24. See, eg., Jones v. Heckler, 744 F.2d 997,998 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the plaintiff's contention that
the suspension of his disability benefits while he is in prison violates the Constitution because it constitutes bill of
attainder); Hopper v. Schweiker, 596 F. Supp. 689, 693 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (noting the plaintiff's belief that
suspending his welfare benefits while he is incarcerated constitutes a bill of attainder); Pace v. United States, 585
F. Supp. 399, 402 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (explaining the plaintiff's argument that suspension of his welfare benefits
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attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment upon an individual or an ascer-
tainable group without a judicial trial?' Specifically, plaintiffs argue that Congress
passed a bill of attainder by eliminating their welfare benefits without affording them
a judicial trial.6 Inmates believe that prohibiting them from receiving welfare
benefits amounts to punitive punishment by legislative authority. 7 Courts, on the
other hand, have held that prohibiting an inmate from receiving public assistance
while in prison is not a form of punishment, but a mere denial of a government
benefit.7 Consequently, the protection against bills of attainder is not violated be-
cause the prohibition of benefits does not constitute a "punishment. ' 29
2. Substantive Due Process
Another constitutional challenge is that prohibiting inmates from receiving public
assistance violates substantive due process.3° Substantive due process protection pro-
vides people with freedom from all arbitrary and purposeless restraints.3' In
particular, inmates believe that congressional restrictions that prohibit inmates from
receiving welfare benefits deprive them of their right to the funds without due pro-
cess of law. 2 The inmates contend that they have a property interest in the receipt of
welfare funds, and that the constitutional protection of life, liberty, and property is
being violated because of an arbitrary decision to withhold welfare benefits from
inmates.3
while incarcerated violates the Constitution because it is a bill of attainder).
25. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,315 (1946) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
277,323 (1986).
26. Hopper, 596 F. Supp. at 693; Pace, 585 F. Supp. at 402.
27. Hopper, 596 F. Supp. at 693; Pace, 585 F. Supp. at 402.
28. See, e.g., Jones, 774 F.2d at 998 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), for the proposition
that the denial of governmental benefits does not constitute punishment within the meaning of the bill of attainder
clause); Pace, 585 F. Supp. at 401 (stating that the Flemming court held that the disqualification of benefits does
not constitute punishment).
29. See Jones, 774 F.2d at 998 (holding that suspension of governmental benefits does not constitute double
jeopardy because it is not considered a punishment); Pace, 585 F. Supp. at 402 (explaining that the denial of
governmental benefits does not violate the cruel and unusual punishment protection because suspension of
governmental benefits is not punishment).
30. Davis v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 799, 799 (4th Cir. 1987); Zipkin v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 16, 17-18 (2d Cir.
1986); Jones, 774 F.2d at 998; Washington v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 718 F.2d 608, 609 (3d Cir.
1983).
31. Harry S. Dannenberg, Case Comment, Parratt v. Taylor. Don't Make a Federal Case Out of It, 63 B.U.
L. RBv. 1187, 1215 (1983); see id. (describing Justice Harlan's definition of substantive due process in a dissenting
opinion).
32. See supra note 30 (citing cases that have challenged restrictions on inmates receiving public assistance
on due process grounds).
33. See, e.g., Washington, 718 F.2d at 610 (relating the plaintiff's claim that the suspension of benefits while
incarcerated is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff of property without due process of law).
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The United States Supreme Court held that the availability of social security
benefits is not an accrued property right protected by the Constitution. 4 Instead, as
one court held, social security benefits are "noncontractual benefits under a social
welfare system. 35 Accordingly, the strict protection guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause does not apply to the prohibition of welfare benefits.' However, the Court
did conclude that such prohibitions must satisfy a rational basis standard?7 The
limitation on receiving public assistance, in other words, must be rationally related
to a legitimate government interest.38
Consistently, courts have held that Congress's prohibition on inmates from
receiving social security benefits serves a legitimate government interest?9 Public
resources are scarce, and prohibiting inmates from "double-dipping" into this finite
and limited pool of money is a legitimate interest of government. 40Moreover, the fact
that inmates are being taken care of while incarcerated demonstrates that there is no
dire concern in providing them with money intended for necessities. 4' Consequently,
courts have held that legislation that prohibits welfare payments to inmates incar-
cerated for thirty days does not violate the Constitution because it is a rational means
of promoting the government's interest in preventing inmates from "double-dipping"
into scarce public resources.42
III. CHAPTER 205 AND PROHIBITING INMATES FROM RECEIVING PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE
The failure to enforce welfare restrictions that prohibit inmates from receiving
public assistance has recently been criticized.43 Chapter 205 strengthens enforcement
by requiring statewide reporting of inmates who are ineligible for public assistance. 4
Reports of inmates receiving welfare checks while in prison have prompted state and
34. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 608 (1960).
35. Davis, 825 F.2d at 800.
36. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 611 (explaining that the Constitution is not violated with every defeasance
of interest covered by the Social Security Act, and that such interests are protected only from arbitrary governmental
action).
37. See id. (holding that the Due Process Clause interposes a bar only to arbitrary classifications that lack
a rational justification).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Davis, 825 F.2d at 801.
40. rd.; see ad. (discussing the legitimate interest in protecting scarce national resources).
41. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (explaining that providing inmates with governmental
assistance while incarcerated is contrary to the welfare system because the government already provides the inmates
with the necessities of life).
42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43. See Lifsher, Checks Go to Prisoners, supra note 1, at A18 (quoting the Deputy Director of Adult
Services as stating that the federal government has grown accustomed to not enforcing the law); Weaver, supra note
6, at Al (reporting that 10% of California's 74,000 county jail inmates get social security benefits).
44. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10985 (enacted by Chapter 205).
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local authorities to assess the enforcement of public assistance laws in California. 5
Specifically, the movement toward enhanced enforcement focuses on improving
communication between local jails and the Department of Social Services (DSS).6
Improving communication between these offices will prevent "double-dipping"
because DSS will notify other agencies when a person becomes ineligible for public
assistance due to incarcerationf
Chapter 205 mandates communication between local jails, DSS, and the agencies
that administer public benefits.'8 Specifically, Chapter 205 requires every city and
county jail to report to DSS, twice each month, every person who has been incar-
cerated for more than thirty days, unless that person has already been reported for
their current incarceration. 9 A format for reporting the information may be estab-
lished, and each report must contain the inmate's name, known aliases, birth date,
social security number, and, if available, their expected release date s
Chapter 205 aims to eliminate illegal distribution of public assistance by
requiring DSS to relay the information it receives to the various agencies that dis-
tribute welfare funds.51 Since administrative costs of local jails will increase because
of the burden of reporting their inmate population, Chapter 205 mandates an appro-
priation from the General Fund so that implementation of this program will begin
immediately5 2 Proponents of Chapter 205 believe that urgency is required to
preserve the public welfare system
5 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Most people agree that recipients who become incarcerated should have their
benefits suspended 5 ' Unfortunately, the laws that prohibit inmates from receiving
45. See Lifsher, Alert Didn't Keep Funds, supra note 3, at B01 (stating that the Director of the California
Department of Corrections has pledged to work with the federal government to prevent prisoners from receiving
illegal payments); Lifsher, Checks Go to Prisoners, supra note 1, at A18 (noting a computer match up of California
prison inmates that showed approximately"0 to 2800 inmates might be receiving illegal social security payments);
Moneyfor Nothing, supra note 5, at B6 (describing a Butte County sheriff who independently checked the welfare
status of his inmates); see also Weaver, supra note 6, at Al (reporting that California officials estimate that the state
could save $36 million to $60 million a year by stopping inmates from receiving public assistance).
46. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10985 (enacted by Chapter 205) (requiring local jails to report to DSS
twice every month).
47. Id. § 10985(c) (enacted by Chapter 205).
48. Id. § 10985(a) (enacted by Chapter 205).
49. Id. § 1 985(a) (enacted by Chapter 205).
50. Id. § 10985(bX1) (enacted by Chapter 205).
51. SEN TEFLooR, COMMmrE ANALYSts oF SB 1556, at 2 (July 9, 1996).
52. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 205, sec. 2, at 3 (enacting CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 10985) (stating
that $230,000 is appropriated from the General Fund to the DSS for implementing this Act in the 1996-97 fiscal
year).
53. See id., sec. 4, at 3 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10985) (stating that this Act shall go into
immediate effect to prevent inappropriate payments of public benefits).
54. See supra Part I (explaining that inmates are receiving public assistance and that this is contrary to the
welfare system).
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welfare assistance are not being enforced.55 Consequently, persons that are convicted
and incarcerated are sent public funds in addition to receiving food, shelter, and
medical assistance while in prison.56 Chapter 205 seeks to enhance enforcement by
requiring local jails to inform public agencies of every person who has been incar-
cerated for thirty days.57 Proponents of Chapter 205 contend that improving the com-
munication between these agencies will allow stricter enforcement of the law pro-
hibiting inmates from receiving welfare.58 Thus, public agencies will know who is




Welfare and Institutions Code § 10985 (new).
SB 1556 (Johnston); 1996 STAT. Ch. 205
55. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (noting that the enforcement of restrictions upon welfare
is not adequate).
56. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
58. SENATE FLOOR, COmmITrEE ANALYSTS OFSB 1556, at 3 (July 9, 1996).
59. Id.
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Law Enforcement Intervention on Behalf of Endangered Adults
Michael C. Weed
I. INTRODUCTION
Growing old is inevitable, and as the saying goes, it's better than the alternative.
However true this statement may be, as Americans age, the situations they confront
may not be as pleasant as would be desired. Today, abuse of the elderly' has become
a significant social problem.
Over the past several decades, the American population has seen a steady rise in
the percentage of elderly citizens. California, in particular, has experienced a steady
increase in its elderly population, and that trend is expected to continue or even
accelerate? As the elderly population increases in number and percentage, simple
mathematics lead to the conclusion that the problem of elder abuse, if left unadd-
ressed, will grow as well.4
The causes of elder abuse have many theoretical explanations, from family
financial pressures to the additional emotional strain caused by having to care for a
dependent adult.5 Whatever the cause, however, it is the resulting abuse that requires
immediate attention.6
Although elder adults are vulnerable to financial misdeeds by their caretakers,
the most common and pressing problem is the physical abuse and neglect which en-
1. Chapter 913 addresses both elderly adults and dependent adults. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
15700(a) (1) (enacted by Chapter 913) (stating that both elder and dependent adults are subject to the abuses
Chapter 913 addresses); see also id. § 15701.15 (enacted by Chapter 913) (defining "dependent adults" as people
between the ages of 18 and 64 who have a physical or mental condition that limits their ability to carry out normal
activities or to protect their individual rights). For the purposes of Chapter 913, both categories are encompassed
by the term "endangered adult." See id. § 15701.25 (enacted by Chapter 913) (including both elder and dependent
adults in the definition of "endangered adult"). Though at times the discussion will be focussed on the elderly adult,
all provisions applicable to the elderly are also applicable to a dependent adult.
2. See Audrey S. Garfield, Note, Elder Abuse and the States' Adult Protective Services Response, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 859, 862-63 (1991) (noting the "greying" of America and the steady rise in the elderly population,
predicted to reach 35 million, or 13% of the population, by the year 2000).
3. See id. at 863 (detailing the dramatic increase in California's elderly population over the past two
decades); Id. (noting the staggering predictions that California's population of people 80 and older is expected to
increase by 94% by the year 2000, and those over 85 are expected to increase by 138% in the same period).
4. See ASSEMBLYFLOOR, COMMnFEEANALYSIsOFAB 2881, at 3 (Aug. 30,1996) (noting that the number
of elder abuse incidents is increasing).
5. See Garfield, supra note 2, at 867-69 (reviewing several of the more common causes of elder abuse, such
as economic pressures, alcohol and drug abuse, and family pressures in conflict with caring for the elderly, such
as the pressure of getting children off to college and the accompanying financial difficulties that entails).
6. While not minimizing the importance of finding solutions to the causes of elder abuse, which would
certainly be the most desirable result in the long run, it seems clear that addressing the resulting abuse is the most
direct and immediate method of bringing about positive results. There is nothing inherently wrong with curing
symptoms in the present, even though eradicating the disease in the future is the ultimate goal.
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dangers many elder adults.7 At times, this physical abuse can reach crisis dimensions,
at which point immediate action is necessary to protect the elder adult from serious
harm.8 It is these situations, requiring rapid action to prevent serious harm, which
Chapter 913 addresses and seeks to remedy.9
II. THE TooLs PROVIDED BY CHAPTER 913
Chapter 913 enacts a statutory mechanism whereby local law enforcement
officials'0 are authorized to remove an elder or dependent adult from an abusive situ-
ation."1 Upon specific determinations,' 2 the law enforcement official is empowered
by Chapter 913 to take the endangered adult 3 into emergency protective custody.' 4
Prior to removal of the endangered adult, however, the law enforcement official must
determine, from personal observation, that the elder or dependent adult is in fact at
immediate risk of serious harm and that no other alternative exists to mitigate the
endangering circumstances.' 5 Upon reaching this determination, the law enforcement
official is authorized to remove the endangered adult from the situation, and transport
7. Garfield, supra note 2 at 864 (citing HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGlNG, 97THM CONG., IST SESs., ELDER
ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OFA HIDDEN PROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981)); see id. (noting that among the many forms
of elder abuse, physical abuse and neglect are the most prevalent); see also CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 15700(a)(1)
(enacted by Chapter 913) (stating the legislature's finding that elder adults may be the victims of physical abuse,
neglect, and abandonment).
8. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15700(a)(4) (enacted by Chapter 913) (stating that cases of severe abuse
may create the immediate risk of serious harm or death); see also ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2881, at 3 (Aug. 30, 1996) (noting that the abuse of elder adults which results in life-threatening situations needs
to be addressed).
9. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15700(b) (enacted by Chapter 913); see id.(stating the legislature's intent
that Chapter 913 provide a mechanism to remove elder adults at risk of imminent harm from abusive situations);
ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMUrTE ANALYSIS OFAB 2881, at 3 (Aug. 30, 1996) (noting that Chapter 913 provides the
means to remove elder adults from life-threatening situations); SENATE FLOOR, COMMrFm' ANALYSIS OF AB 2881,
at 5 (Aug. 27, 1996) (stating that the intent of the author is to enhance the protection of elder adults who are in
imminent danger of serious harm).
10. See CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 15701.1 (enacted by Chapter 913) (defining "local law enforcement"
as a member of a city police or county sheriff department).
11. Id. § 15703 (enacted by Chapter 913); see id. § 15700(b) (enacted by Chapter 913) (noting the intent
of the legislature in enacting Chapter 913 to create a mechanism which allow law enforcement officials to intervene
in abusive situations).
12. See infra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining the conclusions the local law enforcement official
must reach prior to emergency removal of the endangered adult).
13. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15701.25 (enacted by Chapter 913) (defining "endangered adults" as
elder or depende-nt adults who are at risk of immediate serious injury due to suspected abuse or neglect, and who
lack the capacity to protect themselves from the consequences of remaining in the situation); see supra note 1
(discussing the scope of the term "endangered adult").
14. CAL WELF.& INST. CODE § 15703(a) (enacted by Chapter 913); see id. § 15700(b) (enacted by Chapter
913) (stating that the vehicle by which Chapter 913 provides protection to the endangered adult is removal into
emergency protective custody).
15. Id. § 15703(a) (enacted by Chapter 913).
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the person to an appropriate temporary residence. 16 The power to remove is granted
regardless of whether the endangered adult consents to the removal. 7
After removal of the endangered adult, Chapter 913 mandates certain procedural
requirements. 8 Upon removal, the removing authority must notify the superior court,
the endangered adult's next of kin, if appropriate, and Adult Protective Services.19
Within twenty-four hours of removal, a designated county agency must initiate an
investigation, and file a petition with the court for issuance of an emergency
protective order.2° The court must then hold a preliminary hearing in order to deter-
mine if probable cause exists for the emergency protective order.2' This hearing must
be held no later than the day after a forty-eight hour period since the removal has
occurred. 22 Following the preliminary hearing, the court must render its decision
regarding probable cause no later than the day after a seventy-two hour period since
removal has occurred.2 By operation of these requirements, no endangered adult
may be held under emergency protective custody, based on the law enforcement
official's determination alone, for more than seventy-two hours.24
During the hearing process, Chapter 913 requires that the endangered adult be
represented by counsel. 2' Prior to the hearing, notice of the petition for the
emergency protective order must be given to the endangered adult, in language as
reasonably understandable as possible.26 Chapter 913 requires further that the en-
dangered adult be permitted to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses,27 and
16. Id. § 15703.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 913); see id.(requiring the endangered adult to be transported to
an appropriate temporary residence pending the outcome of the investigation and judicial hearing provided by
Chapter 913); see also id. § 15701.5(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 913) (defining "appropriate temporary residence"
as the home of a relative, if free from further risk to the endangered adult, a licensed adult residential care facility
designated as an emergency shelter, or a 24-hour health facility, as designated by § 1250, § 1250.2, and § 1250.3
of the California Health and Safety Code). But see id. § 15701.05(e) (enacted by Chapter 913) (prohibiting Chapter
913 from being utilized to place endangered adults into jails or correctional treatment centers).
17. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 2881, at 2 (Aug. 30, 1996) (stating that Chapter
913 provides local law enforcement with the ability to take endangered adults into emergency protective custody
without the consent of the individual); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15705.2(e) (enacted by Chapter 913)
(requiring a statement of the attempts to obtain the consent of the endangered adult to the intervention, which
implicitly authorizes removal despite the failure to obtain that consent).
18. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15705-15705.30 (enacted by Chapter 913) (detailing the various
procedural requirements within Chapter 913. such as a timely post-removal hearing and representation).
19. Id. § 15703(c) (enacted by Chapter 913).
20. Id. § 15705(a) (enacted by Chapter 913).
21. Id. § 15705(bX1) (enacted by Chapter 913).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 15705(bX2) (enacted by Chapter 913).
24. Id. § 15703.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 913).
25. Id. § 15705.30(b) (enacted by Chapter 913). Chapter 913 provides that if the endangered adult is
indigent or lacks the capacity to waive counsel, the court shall appoint counsel. Id.
26. Id. § 15705.25(a) (enacted by Chapter 913).
27. Id. § 15705.30(c) (enacted by Chapter 913).
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that the court issue its findings in support of any emergency protective order, for the
record.
If the court determines that probable cause does not exist for an emergency
protective order, the court must order the release of the endangered adult.29
Alternatively, if probable cause is determined to exist, the court may order the
continuation of emergency protective custody.30 In order to find probable cause, the
court must determine, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the party is in
fact an endangered adult,31 and that no appropriate alternative to continued emer-
gency protective custody would mitigate the risk of the endangering situation3 2
However, any emergency protective order issued is effective for no longer than
fourteen days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.3 It is during this
period that a hearing seeking long-term protective custody must be initiated?,
Thus, Chapter 913 devotes much attention to detail to procedurally protect the
endangered adult as much as possible. Its provisions attempt to establish concrete
criteria by which emergency protective custody can be implemented and continued.
However, even with the procedural precautions engrafted into Chapter 913, concerns
may arise.
HI. CONCERNS REGARDING CHAPTER 913
A. The Justification for the Intervention
Emergency protective custody, and the nonconsensual removal of the adult that
may be necessitated, is based on the moral position that society has the duty to pro-
tect its endangered citizens who cannot protect themselves. 5 This doctrine has been
applied most commonly to the protection of children, but is being increasingly
applied to situations involving endangered adults?6 In order to be applicable to
adults, the adults must be determined to be incapable of protecting or caring for
themselves?7
28. Id. § 15705.30(e) (enacted by Chapter 913).
29. Id. § 15705.05 (enacted by Chapter 913). Though no reference is included in Chapter 913, it is
reasonable to assume that accompanying the order to release the endangered adult would be provisions for safe
transportation back to the residence from which the person was removed.
30. Id. § 15705.1 (enacted by Chapter 913).
31. See supra notes 1, 13 (defining "endangered adult").
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15705.1(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 913).
33. Id. § 15705.15(c) (enacted by Chapter 913).
34. Id.
35. See Garfield, supra note 2, at 377 (explaining that most state intervention statutes are founded on the
doctrine of parens patriae, the state's responsibility to act as guardian over those who cannot care for themselves).
36. See id. at 877-78 (criticizing states' reliance on the doctrine as more appropriate to child protection than
to adult protection, but acknowledging that many state adult protective statutes are founded on the concept).
37. Id.
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A difficulty arises because adults are presumed to be competent to manage their
own affairs and to be capable of protecting themselves.3 8 However, Chapter 913
provides that adults may be determined to be incapable of fending for themselves
solely on the personal observations of local law enforcement officials. 9 Noncon-
sensual removal of the adult can follow this determination," which essentially
subjugates the autonomy of the adult to the personal determinations of a local law
enforcement official. Critics of intervention statutes, such as Chapter 913, suggest
that subjective determinations based on perceptions of the elderly's capacity only
serve to unjustifiably deny the person's right to self-determination."
Although this concern has validity, on balance, the temporary loss of self-deter-
mination Chapter 913 may create is outweighed by the harm it certainly prevents. In
an emergency situation, where the risk of serious harm is imminent, the state's
responsibility to intervene becomes primary.!2 This shifts the balance between the
adult's autonomy and the state's responsibility, such that the nonconsensual inter-
vention is justified by the prevention of the potential for irreparable harm to the
individual.43 Through emergency intervention, the risk of harm is alleviated at least
temporarily, and in many situations, the reality of serious harm is likely avoided."
38. See id. at 878 (stating that adults are presumed to be competent to make their life decisions, as opposed
to children who are presumed to need custodial supervision).
39. CAL. WEY.. & INST. CODE § 15703(a) (enacted by Chapter 913); see id.(authorizing local law
enforcement officers to remove an adult if the officer determines, based on personal observations alone, that the
adult is an endangered adult, as defined by Chapter 913, and that no alternative exists to mitigate the situation).
40. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMTr'EE ANALYsIS oF AB 2881, at 2 (Aug. 30, 1996) (explaining that Chapter
913 provides the mechanism for the designated official to remove the endangered adult with or without consent for
up to 72 hours); see also CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 15705.2(e) (enacted by Chapter 913) (mandating that a
statement summarizing the petitioner's attempts to obtain the endangered adult's consent be included within the
petition for emergency protective custody, suggesting that intervention without the adult's consent is permitted by
Chapter 913); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1051(2)(a), (b) (West Supp. 1997) (providing for the nonconsensual
removal of an endangered adult based on the determinations of a law enforcement official, to be followed within
twenty-four hours by a petition to the court for continued emergency protective custody); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-
55(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (authorizing nonconsensual removal of an endangered adult when an emergency
situation exists, and expressly noting that the immediacy of the situation would not allow for prior application for
a court order).
41. See Garfield, supra note 2, at 878-79 (explaining that old age itself can at times be perceived as the basis
for incapacity, which then fosters ageism and further clouds the determinations of who is and is not lacking in
capacity).
42. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMM1TrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 2881, at 3 (Aug. 30, 1996) (explaining that Chapter
913 is a response to the increase of abusive incidents involving life-threatening situations to elder and dependent
adults, and that the State needs to address the situation).
43. See Garfield, supra note 2, at 915 (explaining that in an emergency situation, the concern for the adult's
self-determination must be subordinate to protection of physical well-being).
44. See id. (stating that the encroachment on the individual's autonomy, in a true emergency, is certainly
justified by the resulting prevention of serious injury or death).
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Thus, the potential loss of autonomy Chapter 913 creates is offset by the harm that
it prevents."'
B. Procedural Shortcuts Within Chapter 913
A further concern related to Chapter 913 is that it provides for nonconsensual
emergency protective custody of an adult, without providing for a prior hearing and
opportunity to be heard. However, the emergency situation addressed by Chapter
913 again shifts the balance between the formal requirements of due process, and the
need to protect human life.47 When a life-threatening situation exists, rigid adherence
to due process requirements may increase the risk of harm,48 and seems to place
societal priorities in exactly the opposite positions common sense would dictate.
Inherent to the concept of an emergency is the need for immediate action, and often,
the time required to obtain prior court approval for the intervention would make the
point moot.
49
Furthermore, Chapter 913 mandates thorough and detailed post-removal pro-
cedures, designed to ensure that the endangered adult is provided due process pro-
tection throughout the hearing process.50 In this way, Chapter 913 ensures that the
endangered adult receives the formal procedural protection the law requires, as near
45. An alternative rationale has been offered as well. An endangered adult mired in an abusive situation may
have already lost autonomy, due to the abusive situation itself. If removed from that situation, the autonomy of the
individual is not in fact reduced, but enhanced. Thus, nonconsensual intervention, viewed in this light, furthers the
opportunity for the endangered adult's expression of self-determination. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
15700(a)(5) (enacted by Chapter 913) (stating that endangered adults are often deprived of their autonomy and
dignity by the very situations from which Chapter 913 seeks to provide relief).
46. See iL § 15705(a), (b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 913) (requiring that the preliminary hearing occur within
seventy-two hours after emergency protective custody has been initiated, rather than prior to the initial
intervention).
47. See id. § 15700(a)(6), (7) (enacted by Chapter 913) (stating that the limitations of existing law, i.e., the
requirement of court action prior to intervention, have prevented state agencies from being able to intervene in time,
leading to unnecessary and preventable injury and loss of life); see also Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (explaining that "[tihe need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for
what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency").
48. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15700(a)(6) (enacted by Chapter 913) (stating that the limitations of
prior law often delay intervention by the designated agencies, thus preventing them from stopping serious injury
or death).
49. See id. § 15700(a)(7) (enacted by Chapter 913) (stating that delays caused by prior law limitations have
led to injury and death, thus making the later intervention pointless); see also Garfield, supra note 2, at 915
(explaining that in a true emergency, intervention after consent, or after court action, may be unnecessary because
the harm to be avoided has already occurred).
50. See supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text (detailing the notice, representation, hearing, and timing
requirements mandated by Chapter 913, and the grounds on which the court may issue an order continuing
emergency protective custody).
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in time to the intervention as the emergency situation will allow!' When certain
injury or death has been prevented, it seems a little sacrifice for such a large return.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the mechanism created by Chapter 913 may encroach upon an adult's
autonomy from time to time, the harm that it will prevent provides a large benefit to
society overall. At the very least, Chapter 913 provides local law enforcement
agencies with a tool to combat a significant social problem. 2 As the percentage of
elderly citizens rises, the incidence of adults exposed to abusive situations will rise
as well.53 In turn, the need for methods to address this problem will become more
immediate. Until we can find a solution to the problem at its roots, and thus eliminate
the problem, it is necessary to prevent as much of the suffering as possible. By
providing an efficient and immediate method for intervention in life-threatening




Welfare and Institutions Code § 15700 (new).
AB 2881 (Woods); 1996 STAT. Ch. 913
51. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,90-91 (1972) (explaining that when property is sought to be attached
prior to a hearing or opportunity to be heard, "exigent circumstances" such as the need for immediate action, can
justify proceeding without a prior hearing, with due process requirements being satisfied by a post seizure hearing
close in time to the seizure).
52. See SENATEFLooR, CoMM-rEE ANALYSIs OFAB 2881, at 5 (Aug. 27, 1996) (stating that Chapter 913
was enacted because of requests by local law enforcement agencies who were frustrated by their inability to
intervene into life-threatening situations due to prior law). Funding is also a concern surrounding Chapter 913.
Chapter 913 may force additional expenditures in an area of social activism where funding is already insufficient.
However, Chapter 913 provides flexibility where funding may be a significant issue by expressly requiring local
adoption of Chapter 913 by a county's Board of Supervisors, in order for Chapter 913 to be binding on the county.
CAl. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15705.37 (enacted by Chapter 913). Thus, if funding is a determinative factor, a county
is free not to adopt Chapter 913 and its mechanisms for intervention. Id. Furthermore, proponents of Chapter 913
point out that, absent the ability to intervene, avoidable injury and death will continue to occur, thus causing public
health care expenditures that also could have been avoided. See id. § 15700(a)(7) (enacted by Chapter 913) (stating
that avoidable pain and suffering results in unnecessary, additional public expenditures). Viewed from this
perspective, the expense created by Chapter 913 is offset at least partially by the savings created by fewer incidents
of injury or death.
53. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (noting that as the elderly population rises so does the
incidence of elder abuse).
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Escalating health costs gave birth to the alleged paragon of efficiency and cost
control-the health maintenance organization (HMO).' At its birth, witnesses
applauded the good fortune they thought it would bring, good fortune manifest in the
form of lower health care costs to be borne by consumers and greater profits for the
operators of these organizations. 2 Some doctors likely welcomed the new arrival as
well. The hassles and financial pressures of running a medical office would be
handled by business professionals. The doctors could focus just on treating their
patients as they poured in by the hundreds.
The doctors, however, soon realized that a trade-off was involved. Associating
with a large business organization involved a loss of autonomy. 4 Most doctors likely
realized the trade-off, but were taken aback by the intrusion of the so-called "gag-
clause."5 A gag clause prohibits a physician from taking any action or making any
communication that could or might undermine the confidence of enrollees, pros-
pective enrollees, their employers, unions, or the public in the health plan and pro-
vider.6 Though the existence of such clauses is often denied, they are confirmed in
the contracts of the biggest HMOs in the country, and are rumored to be present in
contracts of smaller HMOs as well.7
Doctors have interpreted these clauses to mean that they cannot recommend
treatments that the HMO will not pay for, or does not have; they believe that such
1. See Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Required
to Disclose These to Patients, 83 GEO. LJ. 1821, 1822-23 (1995) (noting that in the late 1960s, rising health care
costs and a demand for high technology care spawned the health maintenance organization).
2. See id
3. See Diane Watson, Keynote Address: The Future of Managed Care, in 16 WHTrrMT L. RLrv. 941, 942
(1995) (illustrating that many health care practitioners have embraced the trend toward managed care).
4. A Gagged Physician Cannot Fully Serve the Patient; If the Offending HMOs Persist, New Laws May
Be Needed, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1996, at pt.-M [hereinafter A Gagged Physician]; see id. (opining that "[mIany
physicians ... are angry about what they see as a loss of income and control under managed care").
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Suzanne Gordon, Perspective on Health Care; Hippocratic or Hbpocrytic Oath?, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1996, at M-5 (quoting U.S. Healthcare's gag clause which mandates the following: "Physician, shall agree
not to take any action or make any communication which undermines or could undermine the confidence of
enrollees, potential enrollees, their employers, their unions, or the public in U.S. Healthcare or the quality of U.S.
Healthcare coverage .. .
7. See id.; see also Tim Bonfield, Doctors Freed of Gag Rule Choice Care Contract No Longer Curbs
Them, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 26, 1996, at 102 (setting forth the "gag clause" in ChoiceCare contracts prior
to May 1, 1996, and discussing how ChoiceCare has eliminated such clauses from contracts entered into subsequent
to May 1, 1996).
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advice will be construed as undermining the confidence of enrollees, a specific
prohibition in gag clauses.8 Contravention of such clauses would result in penalties
ranging from being fined to being fired!
Recently, California joined other states in prohibiting these gag clauses through
the enactment of Chapter 2600 and Chapter 1089.1 Additionally, California enacted
Chapter 1094,12 which provides for specific disciplinary actions against health care
plans that either violate Chapter 1089 or otherwise inhibit the ability of physicians
to advocate medically appropriate treatments. 3
11. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Existing State Law
Existing law declares that it is the public policy of the state to encourage
physicians and surgeons to advocate "medically appropriate health care" for their
patients.14 The law further provides that any person who penalizes a physician for
advocating such care violates public policy. 5 Prior law, however, neither defined
penalize nor prescribed the penalties imposed for such actions.' 6 The relevant code
sections simply noted that actions penalizing physicians for advocating medically
appropriate health care violated public policy.17
Existing law strives to protect physicians from entities which attempt to interfere
with a physician's ability to provide needed health care to patients."' Such inter-
ference not only poses a risk of harm to the patient, but also subjects the treating
physician or surgeon to a malpractice suit.' 9 California case law mandates that a
physician or surgeon must provide care on par with physicians or surgeons similarly
8. See A Gagged Physician, supra note 4, at M-4 (describing how physicians interpret gag clauses).
9. See id, (listing penalties for physicians who violate gag clauses).
10. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (amended by Chapter 260).
11. Id. § 2056.1 (enacted by Chapter 1089).
12. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1386 (amended by Chapter 1094); CAL. INS. CODE § 10120.5 (enacted
by Chapter 1094).
13. CAL. INS. CODE § 10120.5 (enacted by Chapter 1094).
14. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056(b) (amended by Chapter 260); see id. (defining "advocate for medically
appropriate health care" as appealing a payor's decision to deny payment for a service through the grievance or
appeal procedure available to the physician or surgeon, or "protest[ing] a decision, policy, or practice" that prevents
the physician from providing medically appropriate health care); see also Wickline v. State, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630,
1644-45, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (1986) (holding that physicians or surgeons are subject to a malpractice action
if they do not protest a third-party payor's denial, when means for protest or appeal are provided).
15. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056(c) (amended by Chapter 260); see SENATE JUDIcIARY COMMrrrEE,
CoMMrrEE ANALYSS oF SB 1847, at 2 (May 14, 1996) (explaining that interference with doctor-patient discourse
violates public policy).
16. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1119, sec. 2, at 5532 (amending CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056).
17. See id.
18. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (amended by Chapter 260); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1386
(amended by Chapter 1094).
19. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrIrEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1847, at 5 (May 14,1996).
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situated.20 Additionally, the physician must obtain the patient's informed consent
before rendering treatment; failure to obtain such consent can subject the physician
to charges of battery.2'
Informed consent requires that the patient be given sufficient information to
make an intelligent decision about either consenting to, or rejecting, a proposed treat-
ment.22 Further, the courts have held that to qualify as informed consent the patient
must be apprised of alternatives to the proposed treatment, as well as the dangers
inherent in those alternatives. 23 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 260, California law
did not specifically address the issue of limitations imposed by health care providers
on physician-patient dialogue regarding alternative treatments.24
Existing law broadly prescribes penalties for health care providers who interfere
with a physician's or surgeon's ability to provide needed care.25 Prior to the enact-
ment of Chapter 1089, California law neglected to specifically mention gag clauses
or confidentiality clauses that inhibit a physician's ability to provide that care.26
Chapter 1089 fills this void, thereby protecting the 12 million Californians that
belong to health maintenance organizations.27
B. The Effects of Chapters 260, 1089, and 1094
1. Chapter 260
By enacting Chapter 260, California directly addresses the physicians' plight
with health maintenance organizations. Chapter 260 adds needed specificity to the
Business and Professions Code, thereby accomplishing two important goals. First,
Chapter 260 specifically prohibits persons from discouraging physicians or surgeons
from advocating for medically appropriate health care. 28 This prevents physicians and
surgeons from being terminated, retaliated against, or otherwise penalized for
advocating care for their patients. 29 Second, Chapter 260 includes a specific provision
that prohibits persons from discouraging physicians from communicating to a patient
"information in furtherance of medically appropriate health care.' '3
20. Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399,408,551 P.2d 389,392-93, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69,72-73 (1976).
21. Cobb3 v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,243, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,514 (1972).
22. Id.
23. SENATE JUDICiARY COMMrr'EE, COMMrTTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1847, at 4 (May 14, 1996); see, e.g.,
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
24. Id.
25. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1386 (amended by Chapter 1094).
26. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1119, sec. 2, at 5532 (amending CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §2056).
27. See ASSEMBLYCOMMmEEoNsuRAcECOMMITTEEE ANALYSIS OFAB 3013, at 2 (Apr. 16, 1996)
(noting that 12 million Californians subscribe to HMOs).
28. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056(c) (amended by Chapter 260).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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2. Chapter 1089
Chapter 1089 expands the protection afforded to consumers and physicians one
step further. Chapter 1089 adds a provision to the Business and Professions Code
which addresses the so-called "gag" or "confidentiality clauses" found in some
physicians' contracts with HMOs.?' Chapter 1089 seeks to ensure that health care
service plans do not enter into contracts with physicians and surgeons which affect
a physician's and surgeon's "ethical responsibility to discuss with [his or her]
patients information relevant to a patient's health care." 32 Accordingly, Chapter 1089
provides that "health care service plans and their contracting entities shall not include
provisions in their contracts that interfere with the ability of a physician and surgeon
... to communicate with a patient ... ."3 In effect, this language prohibits gag or
confidentiality clauses.
3. Chapter 1094
Chapter 1094 gives teeth to Chapters 260 and 1089 by providing for enforcement
against health care providers who utilize gag or confidentiality clauses? Section
1386 of the California Health and Safety Code provides the health and safety com-
missioner with the power and authority to suspend or revoke licenses issued to health
care service plans by the Board of Commissioners, if the provider is in violation of
one of the provisions listed under § 1386.35 Loss of a license to operate could be
potentially devastating to a service provider.
Chapter 1094 adds another item to the list of conditions which could precipitate
the suspension or loss of a health care service plan's license.36 The addition provides
that a violation of § 510, § 2056, or § 2056.1 of the Business and Professions Code
may result in suspension or loss of license by the health care service plan?7 As
explained previously, § 2056 and § 2056.1 relate to the interference by health care
service plans with a physician's or surgeon's ability to advocate for appropriate
medical care.38
31. Id § 2056.1 (enacted by Chapter 1089).
32. Id. §2056.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 1089).
33. 111 § 2056.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 1089).
34. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1386(b) (amended by Chapter 1094).
35. This license allows health care service plans to operate in the State of California. See id (listing specific
acts or omissions that constitute grounds for disciplinary action by the Commissioner, including opevting in such
a manner as to constitute a substantial risk to the plan's enrollees or subscribers).
36. Id. § 1386(bX13) (amended by Chapter 1094).
37. Id.
38. CAL. Bus.& PRoF. CoDE § 2056 (amended by Chapter 260); see id. §2056.1 (enacted by Chapter 1089)
(defining "interference with physicians and surgeons" and articulating their responsibilities to advocate for their
patients).
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Similarly, Chapter 1094 affects disability insurers by expanding the Insurance
Code.39 Chapter 1094 provides that disability insurers are also subject to loss or sus-
pension of licenses if they violate § 510, § 2056, or § 2056.1 of the California
Business and Professions Code.4° In short, disability insurers are now subject to the
same restrictions as health care service plan operators, insofar as they may not inter-
fere with a physician's or surgeon's attempt to advocate for medically appropriate
care.41 This interference, as prohibited, relates not only to contracts, but to other
interactions with physicians and surgeons as well.!2
C. State Attempts at Eliminating Gag Clauses
California is not the first to enact legislation eliminating gag clauses from con-
tracts and liberalizing a physician's ability to communicate with patients.43 A number
of other states have responded to the growing dissatisfaction with HMOs by passing
legislation that, like the newer California legislation, prohibits HMOs from inserting
gag clauses in their contracts." In some states, HMOs are being fought indirectly
through the courts also.45 In short, HMOs are being attacked from all sides.
Stronger than California's approach, Tennessee is working on a bill that imposes
civil penalties for HMOs that violate the soon-to-be-passed anti-gag clause legis-
lation." Such an approach may curtail gag-clause abuse. The difficulty might only
lie in the enforcement of such fines. Considering the fines are $1000 to $5000 per
violation, they may not be large enough to seriously dissuade HMOs from continuing
to include the prohibited provisions in their contracts4
39. CAL. INS. CODE § 10120.5 (enacted by Chapter 1094).
40. Compare id. § 10120.5 (enacted by Chapter 1094) (inhibiting the ability of disability insurers to interfere
with doctor-patient discourse) with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056(c) (amended by Chapter 260) (providing that
no person may prevent a doctor from communicating necessary information to a patient).
41. CAL. INs. CODE § 10120.5 (enacted by Chapter 1094).
42. ird.
43. See Nancy W. Dickey, AMA to Big Managed Care: Ungag Doctors, AM. MED. News, Feb. 26, 1996,
at 37 (noting that Massachusetts banned gag clauses and New Jersey and California are "poised to follow"); Patrick
Graham, State Doctors Win Legislative Ban on 'Gag Clauses,' MEMPHIS Bus. J., Apr. 22, 1996, at 25 (explaining
that anti-gag clause legislation passed the Tennessee Legislature and will likely be signed into law).
44. Dickey, supra note 43, at 37 (listing Massachusetts, California, New Jersey, and New York as states that
have either banned 'gag' clauses altogether or are presently attempting to eliminate them).
45. See Physicians Sue N. Health Department over HMO Contracts, MANAGED CARE OUTOOK, Jan. 9,
1996, at *1, available in 1996 WL 10117063 (noting that doctors are attacking H/MOs indirectly by suing the State
of New York that reviews HMO contracts with physicians).
46. Graham, supra note 43, at 25; see id. (listing the fines for violation of the anti-gag clause legislation as
ranging from $1000 to $5000 per day and per violation).
47. Id.
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D. Birth of the Patient Right to Know Act
The legislative action of other states and the persistent lobbying of the American
Medical Association likely provided impetus for the Patient Right to Know Act.4
The act, similar in effect to Chapters 260, 1089, and 1094, alms to prevent health
plans from interfering with doctor-patient communication 9 In particular, it strictly
prohibits interference with certain medical communications.O The bill defines
"medical communications" as including almost all communications between a
physician and patient, excluding only knowing and willful misrepresentations from
protection.5t
Part of the congressional impetus to eliminate gag rules centers on the problems
that "gag" clauses present in the area of informed consent.52 Similar to the concerns
at the state level, inhibiting informed consent not only places the patient at risk, but
subjects the physician or surgeon to potential medical malpractice.53 On the subject
of malpractice and overriding patient concerns, Dr. Robert McAffee, a former
president of the American Medical Association, testified that "gag" clauses in con-
tracts are analogous to a wedge between a physician and his patient.
Attendant to specific prohibitions against interference, the Patient Right to Know
Act contains some serious penalty provisions. The bill prescribes a penalty of
$25,000 per violation, or up to $100,000 per violation if a pattern of violations can
be established over the previous five years.55 Such strict provisions might give this
legislation the "teeth" it needs to be effective once signed into law.
Congress has never addressed the issue of gag clauses in providers' contracts
directly.5 Accordingly, this resolution may signal Congress's willingness to regulate
an additional area.57 Bipartisan support for the measure is evidenced by Repre-
48. HR 2976, 104th Cong. §§ 1, 2 (1996). This bill is also known as the "Patient Right to Know Act," and
has not been enacted yet.
49. Id.§1
50. See id § 2 (the doctor-patient communications with which HMOs may not interfere include communi-
cations "regarding the mental or physical health care needs or treatment of a patient and the provisions, terms, or
requirements of the health plan").
51. Id.
52. Prepared Statement of Rep. Ed Markey Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means Health
Subcommittee on HR 2976, The Patient Right to Know Act, FED. DocumENT CLEARING HOUSE, July 30, 1996, at
*1, available in 1996 WL 10830250 [hereinafter Statement ofRep. Markey].
53. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972); see id. (explaining that lack of
informed consent from the patient subjects a doctor to a malpractice claim).
54. Managed Care: Congress Looks at Physician "Gag" Clauses, AM. HEALTH LINE, May 31, 1996, at *I,
available in Westlaw, 5/31/96 APN-HE3; see id. (quoting testimony by Dr. Robert McAffee, past president of the
AMA, as stating that gag clauses "present an inherent ethical conflict of interest" by placing a wedge between
physicians and patients).
55. HR 2976, 104th Cong. § 2(1996).




sentatives Greg Ganske, M.D. (Republican-Iowa) and Edward J. Markey (Democrat-
Massachusetts), who cosponsored the bill.58 Additionally, Representative Markey
reported that the bill has some 130 sponsors from both sides of the aisle, indicating
strong congressional support5 9
Despite support, the bill is not without its detractors. Managed care executives
fear that the bill may impede the HMO's proprietary integrity.W They continue to
downplay the existence and prevalence of gag clauses in general, and fear express




The infamous gag clause takes many forms, but frequently appears in the form
of a "disparagement" clause.62 The disparagement clause prohibits the physician or
surgeon from making any statements to the enrollee which might undermine that
individual's confidence in the plan. 63 The Consumers Union notes that doctors have
interpreted these provisions to mean that they may not discuss alternative treatment
methods if they are not covered by the plan.6 Additionally, doctors have interpreted
these gag clauses to mean that they may not recommend treatments which they fear
will not be approved by the plan, though the treatment is sometimes authorized by
the plan.6
For instance, one proponent argued that a doctor who fears that machine error
produced an inaccurate result in a patient's mammogram may not be able to order an
additional mammogram for confirmation. Why? The doctor may fear that if he or
she orders the additional test, and it is rejected, his or her action will be viewed as
"undermining" the confidence of the enrollee in the plan. 7 Prior to the passage of
Chapters 260, 1089, and 1094, the doctor would have feared retaliation from the
58. See id. (listing members from both the Republican and Democratic parties who support the legislation).
59. See Statement of Rep. Markey, supra note 52, at *1.
60. See Gag Clauses Rarely in Contracts, Not Often Used to Dump Physicians, MANAGED CARE WEEK, Feb.
12, 1996, at M-4 [hereinafter Gag Clauses] (noting that HMOs use gag clauses to prevent the disclosure of
proprietary information or the unnecessary spoiling of patients' opinions of the health plan).
61. I4
62. SENATE RuLEs CoMMrrrEE, CommrTIEE ANALYSiS OF SB 1805, at 4 (May 20, 1996); see id. (listing
"disparagement" clauses as a form of "gag" clause).




66. See Gordon, supra note 6, at M-5 (relating the story of a 49-year-old woman whose physician was too
afraid to order an additional mammogram).
67. ld.
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HMO for this action. This scenario is but one of many that physicians must endure
almost daily.
Gag clauses place doctors between the proverbial rock and hard place. Aside
from attendant ethical responsibilities, a doctor or surgeon in California has cause to
fear malpractice." Gag clauses, and other forms of physician-intimidation, only
heighten the potential for malpractice.6 Of particular concern to physicians in
California is the case of Cobbs v. Grant.7° The Cobbs court held that physicians are
under a duty to disclose the available choices of possible therapy and the dangers
associated with each.71 Failure to properly inform a patient means that the patient has
not given "informed consent."
72
On the same note, Sinz v. OwensP requires that a physician refer a patient to a
specialist when the physician believes that "superior treatment might thereby be
obtained." 74 Prior to Chapters 260, 1089, and 1094, the physician could not refer a
patient to a specialist outside the plan, even if it is believed one is merited.75 How-
ever, in order to satisfy "informed consent" concerns, as well as ethical ones, a doctor
should be able to refer outside the plan, if the plan does not have a specialist.
Proponents, such as the California Liability Insurers, argue that the new legis-
lation frees physicians from the malpractice dilemma.!6 Now physicians may fully
inform their patients about all possible medical alternatives without fear of
retribution from health care plans.77 Full disclosure of alternatives is likely to satisfy
the standards for informed consent and translate into knowledgeable patients. These
well-informed patients, in turn, are able to act in their best interest" For these
reasons, the net effect of the new legislation is timely and wise.
B. Ethical Responsibilities
In taking the Hippocratic oath, physicians and surgeons alike pledge to advocate
for the best interests of their patients . 79 Any attempt to interfere with the conveying
68. SENATE RULES COMMrEE, CoMMrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1847, at 5 (May 20,1996); see id. (arguing
that "a physician is caught between often conflicting legal obligations which places him or her at legal risk of
malpractice, and which may prevent the patient from obtaining appropriate medical care").
69. See id.
70. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505(1972).
71. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514; see SENATE JUDICIARY COMMImTEE, COMMITrEE
ANALYSIS OFSB 1847, at 4 (May 14, 1996) (citing and explaining the holding in Cobbs v. Grant).
72. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
73. 33 Cal. 2d 749,205 P.2d 3 (1949).
74. Sinz, 33 Cal. 2d at 758,205 P.2d at 8; SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMInEE, COMMrFIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB
1847, at 4 (May 14, 1996); see id. (explaining the holding and its ramifications).
75. SENATEJUDICiARYCOmmrEE, COMM1TfEE ANALYSISoFSB 1847, at4 (May 14, 1996).
76. SENATE RuLS CoOmmrrTEE, CoMMrE ANALYSIS oFSB 1847, at 5 (May 20, 1996).
77. Id.
78. See Graham, supra note 43, at 25 (postulating that "[w]ell-informed patients clearly make far better
health care decisions").
79. See Gordon, supra note 6 (quoting a portion of the Hippocratic Oath taken by doctors).
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of medical information would be unethical. With reference to this ethical respon-
sibility, the California Association of Opthamology notes that "[w]hen health plans
control what can and cannot be spoken between a physician.., and patients, the
physician's ethical responsibility to act as an advocate and advisor is seriously
impaired."' ' Although fear of retaliation or intimidation by the health plan was a
reality before the enactment of Chapters 260, 1089, and 1094, physicians are now
free to communicate without fear.
C. Opposition
Not surprisingly, the newly enacted legislation met opposition from the Califor-
nia Association of HMOs 8' First, the association denies the extensive use of gag
clauses in contracts between physicians and health care service organizations!'
Opponents assert that the problem is rooted in physicians' interpretations of the
contract provisions, rather than in the contracts themselves.83 Critics argue that there
should be a means for HMOs to fight the tendency of some physicians to advocate
plan switching.84 Plan switching causes problems when a physician has financial
interests in another plan, and accordingly advocates that the patient switch over to
that plan, under the guise of serving that patient's best interest.85 To opponents, the
new legislation is overly broad. 6
Opponents suggest that the new legislation should be confined to discussing a
patient's medical condition. 7 Additionally, opponents believe that eliminating any
kind of gag clause will enable the physician to disclose proprietary information. 8
This information is not needed for the patient to make a good decision about a health
care option.39 In short, the legislation is deemed unnecessary. 0
80. SENATE COMITTE ON INSURANCE, Co MMTH ANALYSTS OF AB 3013, at 4 (June 9, 1996).
81. SENATE RULES CoMMrrrE COMMrrNE ANALYSIS oFSB 1805, at 5 (May 20, 1996); see id. (listing the
reasons why the association does not support the bills).
82. See id. (finding only one gag clause in a review of HMO provider contracts in use in California).
83. SeeA Gagged Physician, supra note 4, at M-4 (noting that HMOs claim the clauses are to "encourage
doctors to discuss their concerns about payment and treatment policies with health plan representatives rather than
complaining to patients").
84. SExATERULEsCOMMrn, CO.MITTEANALYSiSOFSB 1847, at 6 (May 20, 1996); see id. (explaining
that there is nothing in the new legislation which prevents a physician from encouraging a patient to switch to a
health plan where the physician has a financial interest).
85. Id.
86. ASSE mLYCOMMrrrEEoNINSURANC, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS oF AB 3013, at 3 (Apr. 10, 1996); see
id. (noting that though opponents are not opposed to free discourse, they believe the present legislation should be
narrowly construed).
87. Id.
88. See Gag Clauses, supra note 60, at M-4 (noting that "gag" clauses are intended to prevent the disclosure
of proprietary information).
89. SENATE JtDiCiARY COMNmrEE, CoMxmrEEANALYSIS OFSB 1805, at 5 (May 14,1996); see id. (citing
overbreadth as one of the opponents' reasons for rejecting the bill).
90. See id. (suggesting that disputes can be addressed through provider dispute resolution).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The antagonism toward managed care companies flowered in the form of
legislation limiting the ability of heath care plans to inhibit doctor-patient discourse. 91
The intervention manifests itself in the form of both anti-gag clause legislation and
legislation which strengthened the prohibition against other kinds of interference, as
well.92 Chapters 260, 1089, and 1094 force providers to redraw their contracts in
order to eliminate the provisions that they claim do not exist 93 California's legis-
lation, though not the first, indicates a trend pointing toward stricter regulation of
managed care.94
To the HMO industry, which grows bigger each year, this legislation spells the
end of an unbridled reign. In fact, in light of the pending federal legislation in this
area, regulation may grow more acute as time goes on.95 To the consumer, this means
a chance at more informed decisionmaking. To the doctor, this legislation marks the
end of managed care reprisals for providing patients with all of the information.
APPENDIX
Code Sections Affected
Business and Professions Code § 2056.1 (new).
AB 3013 (Alby); 1996 STAT. Ch. 1089
Health and Safety Code § 1386 (amended); Insurance Code § 10120.5 (new).
SB 1805 (Rosenthal); 1996 STAT. Ch. 1094
Business and Professions Code § 2056 (amended).
SB 1847 (Russel); 1996 STAT. Ch. 260.
91. See Dickey, supra note 43, at 37 (listing states that have proposed or passed legislation to eliminate gag
clauses).
92. See id. (illustrating the nature of the anti-gag clause legislation being considered by various states).
93. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (amended by Chapter 260); i § 2056.1 (enacted by Chapter 1089);
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1386 (amended by Chapter 1094); CAL. INS. CODE § 10120.5 (enacted by Chapter
1094).
94. See Dickey, supra note 43, at 37.
95. See HR 2976, 104th Cong. §§ 1, 2 (1996) (setting forth restrictions on the ability of managed care
providers to restrict doctor-patient discourse through gag-clauses).
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Who Will Receive the Organs: Will You Receive a Life-Saving
Transplant If You Have a Disability?
Jennifer L. Gibson
I. INTRODUCTION
Sandra Jensen had impressive credentials. She has was a consultant with the
World Interdependence Fund, a nonprofit agency assisting the disabled; a speaker at
conferences in Sacramento and Washington, D.C.; and a White House guest for the
1990 signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act.' Sandra Jensen also had Down
Syndrome2 and was denied the opportunity for the heart-lung transplant that would
ultimately be needed to save her life for more than two years.3 On January 22, 1996,
Sandra Jensen finally received the heart-lung transplant, necessary because of a life-
long heart mummer that is a direct result of her Down Syndrome Ms. Jensen
became the first person with Down Syndrome to undergo a heart-lung transplant, and
did so after winning a two-year legal battle and a struggle with government agencies
to secure the necessary funding for the operation.5
II. BACKGROUND
In an effort to prevent others from facing the same discrimination that was faced
by Sandra Jensen, Assemblymember Villaraigosa introduced legislation to prevent
any hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement organization from determining the
recipient of an anatomical gift on the basis of the potential recipient's physical or
1. Peter Rowe,All She Can Ask Is a Fair Chance at Life, SAN DIEGO UNiON-TRIB., Aug. 22, 1995, at El.
2. "Down Syndrome" is defined as mongolism, trisomy 21 S., a syndrome of mental retardation associated
with a variable constellation of abnormalities caused by representation of at least a critical portion of chromosome
21 three times instead of twice in some or all cells. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY (25th ed. 1990) No single
physical sign is diagnostic, and most stigmata are found in some normal persons. Id. The abnormalities include:
retarded growth, flat hypoplastic face with short nose, prominent epicanthic skin folds, protruding lower lip, small
rounded ears with prominent antihelix, fissured and thickened tongue, lackness ofjoint ligaments, pelvix displasia,
broad hands and feet, stubby fingers usually with displasia of the middle phalanx of the fifth finger, transverse
palmer crease, dermatoglyphic changes including distal displacement of thm, palmer axial triradius, dry rough skin
in older patients and abundant slack neck skin in newborns, muscle hypotonia, and absence of Moro reflex in
newborns. Id. Most patients are trisomic for chromosome 21 as a result of nondisjunction. Id. Some patients are
mosaic, with both normal and trisomic cell lines. Id. A few patients have 46 chromosomes but are effectively
trisomic because oftranslocation on a major portion of chromosome 21 to another chromosome. Id. In rare patients
no chromosome abnormality can be detected. Id.
3. Cynthia Hubert, "I Feel Pretty Good," SACRAMENTo BEF, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al.
4. Id.
5. See Rowe, supra note 1. at El (indicating that the large numbers of people waiting for transplants
necessitates that doctors be convinced ofthe potential success of an organ transplant, as well as the patient's ability
to maintain a regime of post-operative care, before allowing a patient to undergo a transplant).
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mental disability.6 This law's definition of "disability" conforms with the definition
found in the Americans with Disabilities Act! Also, the potential recipient of the
anatomical gift would not be required to demonstrate post-operative independent
living skills in order to receive a transplant 8 The potential recipient simply must
demonstrate that the recipient will receive the adequate support and assistance
necessary for long-term post-operative success. 9 Proponents of Chapter 96 argue that
while it is necessary to make certain determinations about potential organ recipients,
the medical establishment should not make arbitrary decisions on the basis of a
person's disability. 0 By denying access to disabled persons simply because of
unfounded beliefs about the person's mental and physical capabilities, a hospital or
physician would effectively be refusing a patient a much needed organ solely on the
basis of stereotypes and arbitrary policies."
However, Chapter 96 still allows physicians and surgeons to evaluate each
recipient on a case-by-case basis to determine if the person's disability would
medically hinder the successful transplantation of an anatomical gift. 2 Chapter 96
would not require physicians to perform any medically inappropriate transplant.3
Chapter 96 applies to the entire transplant process beginning with the referral by a
primary care provider, to a specialist, and finally, continuing to the official placement
of the person on the transplant waiting list.'4 Chapter 96 also requires courts to give
priority to those actions brought to seek the enforcement of its provisions under the
law. 5
6. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7153.2 (enacted by Chapter 96).
7. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 1995) (defining "disability" with respect to an individual as an
impairment either mental or physical that places considerable limits on one or more of the major life activities
enjoyed by the individual; and requiring a record of such an impairment or that the person must be seen as having
a substantial physical or mental impairment); see also Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-
12213 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7153.2(c) (enacted by Chapter 96); see id. (enacted by Chapter 96)
(providing that a person need not present these skills as a prerequisite to obtaining the transplant, if there is evidence
that the person will have sufficient assistance in maintaining the post-operative care).
9. L
10. ASSEMBLY FLOOR COMMrrrEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2861, at 2 (May 24, 1996).
11. Id.
12. CAL.,HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7153.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 96).
13. See SENATE COMMIrEE ON HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COMM=FEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2861, at 2
(June 12, 1996) (providing that there are no transplants required under the law, and that the law only requires that
physicians and hospitals evaluate each potential transplant recipient on a case-by-case basis, using only legitimate
medical concerns when considering the potential success of a transplant).
14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7153.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 96).
15. Id. § 7153.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 96).
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II. Do CURRENT LAWS ALREADY PROTECT THOSE WITH DISABILITIES?
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination based on
a person's disability. 6 The ADA is comprehensive in providing protections for
individuals with disabilities, but it is silent on organ transplantation.17 Although the
denial of organ transplants has not been litigated under the ADA, it is likely that the
ADA provides protections for individuals with disabilities who are seeking trans-
plants."1 In Kinney v. Yerusalim,'9 the court held that the ADA was enacted to address
and remedy the discrimination experienced by persons with disabilities, and in order
to give effect to this ideal, the court must construe the statute broadly.20 Although
Ms. Jensen would still have to prove that she was discriminated against by the
hospitals, it seems likely that Ms. Jensen could have brought her cause of action
alleging discrimination on the part of the hospital under the ADA. Also, it is
import-nt to remember that cases that have interpreted the meaning of "public entity"
for the purposes of determining who is prohibited from discriminating against those
with disabilities have done so to include a wide range of public and private entities.
2
'
Proponents of Chapter 96 argue that while the ADA may cover such eventualities,
litigation would be required to interpret the ADA in places where it is silent, and
could potentially cost the lives of those who do not have the time to litigate a possible
organ transplant.22
Case law is silent on the organ transplant gap in the ADA. However, it is likely
that parallels could be drawn to a case like Coleman v. Zatechka.3 In this case, a
university student brought suit under the ADA because the university refused to
consider her for regular placement among other students who were not disabled when
16. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 1995) (announcing that discrimination against individuals with
disabilities can be seen in numerous areas of society, and individuals with disabilities have encountered historical
discrimination as well as intentional discrimination; and concluding that the nation should attempt to give those
with disabilities the opportunity to fully participate in society); see also id. § 12132 (West 1995) (stating that
qualified individuals may not be excluded from participating in certain activities, nor may they be denied benefits,
services, access to programs, or access to the activities of a public entity because of their disability, nor may they
be discriminated against by any entity on the basis of their disability).
17. Id. § 12132 (West 1995); see SENATE COMMrTTEE ON HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COMMITrE
ANALYSIS OF AB 2861, at 2 (June 12, 1996); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West 1995) (prohibiting discrimination
based on a person's disability, but remaining silent regarding organ transplants).
18. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND HuMAN SERvicEs, CoMtTTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2861, at 2 (June
12, 1996).
19. 812 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
20. Kinney, 812F.Supp.at551.
21. See, e.g., Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1367-68 (D. Neb. 1993) (providing that the ADA
is not limited to just those entities receiving federal funding, but instead applies to all public entities, which may
include states, and any department or agency); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252, 1258-59 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (indicating that the ADA expanded the Rehabilitation Act from public facilities receiving federal funding
to any public entity).
22. SENATE COMMrrrEEON HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COmfMrra ANALYSIS OF AB 2861, at 2 (June
12, 1996).
23. 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993).
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it came to student housing because the student needed the care of a personal
attendant.24 The plaintiff in Coleman argued successfully that the university's policy
was arbitrary, and that it did not take into account her personal characteristics.25 In
essence, the policy excluded her from regular student housing simply because she
had a disability.6
Although there was no stated policy at the hospitals who denied Sandra Jensen
her transplant, the medical, centers at the University of California at San Diego
(UCSD), and Standford both denied Sandra Jensen a transplant based solely on her
disability 7 The argument the plaintiff made in Coleman is precisely the argument
made by Sandra Jensen as she lobbied to receive her life-saving transplant.2
Stanford and the UCSD were convinced to take another look at Ms. Jensen's case
after they were warned against rejecting Ms. Jensen without good cause?
In order for Ms. Jensen to prevail under the relevant ADA case law, she would
have to demonstrate that she was: (1) Disabled under the meaning of the ADA, (2)
qualified to receive the transplant irrespective of her disability, and (3) was denied
the transplant on the basis of her disability and for no other reason?' Ms. Jensen's
toughest battle would have been to prove that the physicians at the respective
hospitals denied her request for a transplant solely based on her disability. Undoub-
tedly, the hospitals would have argued that their denial of Ms. Jensen was based on
the medical facts indicating that she was not an appropriate candidate for a heart-lung
transplant.
A California act also offered Ms. Jensen a remedy before the legislature even
enacted Chapter 96. California Civil Code § 51, also known as the Unruh Civil
Rights Act, provides that persons with disabilities are entitled to "full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business es-
tablishments of every kind whatsoever."3' It appears likely that Ms. Jensen's case
would have been covered under either the ADA or the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
24. Coleman, 824 F. Supp. at 1366.
25. Id. at 1372.
26. Id.; see id. (holding that the school's policy prohibiting the assignment of roommates to students with
disabilities who required personal attendant care violated the ADA.)
27. SENATE COMMITrEEON HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICEs, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2861, at 2 (June
12, 1996); see Letter from Antonio Villaraigosa, Assemblymember, California State Assembly, to Pete Wilson,
Governor, State of California (June 24, 1996) [hereinafter Letter from Assemblymember ViDlaraigosa] (on file with
the Pacific Law Journal) (explaining that Stanford initially rejected Ms. Jensen with a letter stating "we do not feel
that patients with Down Syndrome make appropriate candidates for organ transplants"). Neither hospital took into
account her individual abilities or independent living skills. Id.
28. Letter from Assemblymember Villaraigosa, supra note 27.
29. Hubert, supra note 3, at Al.
30. See, e.g., Bonner v. Lewis, 867 F.2d 559, 562-63 (9th Cir 1988); Harding v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 907
F. Supp. 386,389-90 (E.D. Pa 1995); see Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1995)
(providing that the evidence must show that the plaintiff is a handicapped individual, otherwise qualified for
services, and was excluded because of the handicap, and that the program or activity received federal funding).
31. CAL.CIV.CODE§ 51 (West Supp. 1997); see id. (explaining also that any violation of the ADA would
be determined to be a violation of this Act as well).
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However, advocates of Chapter 96 did not wish for Ms. Jensen or others with similar
conditions to be forced to litigate their need for an organ transplant when many times
these potential recipients are already critically ill?
2
IV. CONCLUSION
Advocates for Chapter 96 are well aware of the scarcity of organs and the
number of individuals who are currently waiting for organs.3 However, it is doubtful
that requiring hospitals to evaluate persons with disabilities on a case-by-case basis
will dramatically increase those potential recipients placed on the waiting list 4
Although people will be watching closely to see how well Ms. Jensen does with her
new transplant, most children born with Down Syndrome today are unlikely to need
a heart-lung transplant because now a surgical procedure exists to correct heart and
lung problems early in childhood?'
Although it does not appear that Chapter 96 will have far-reaching ramifications
when it comes to the number of potential recipients placed on the donor registry, this
does give hope to those with disabilities who may have been denied a transplant
solely on the basis of their disability. It is difficult to determine who should receive
an organ transplant, and physicians struggle with who would be the best candidate
for an anatomical gift.36 However, Chapter 96 now requires that all persons, be given
an equal opportunity for a transplant, and that their cases be judged on the medical
merits instead of denying them initially because of their mental or physical disability.
For fourteen months Ms. Jensen's heart and lung transplant appeared to have
been a success.37 It allowed her to continue a healthy and productive life.38
Ultimately, however, Ms. Jensen died as a result of complications of her transplant.
39
32. News Release from Antonio R. Villaraigosa, Assemblymember, California State Assembly (Feb. 22,
1996) (on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that persons awaiting transplants do not have the time to wait
for the courts to reach their case, and explaining it is necessary that the law settle this outside of the courts).
33. See id. (indicating that the number of individuals who donate their organs has stayed static for the last
five years); id. (providing that about 5000 of every 4 million people who die donate their organs, while the waiting
list has continued to grow over the last five years to include approximately 41,000 people).
34. Carey Goldberg, Her Survival Proves Doubters Wrong, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1996, at Al.
35. Id.
36. See id. (quoting Dr. Nicholas Halasz, chairman of the Ethics Committee of the United Network for
Organ Sharing, as stating that while physicians try to decide on medical considerations only, they find themselves
agonizing about the benefits the person and society may receive when deciding whether or not to give an organ to
a person with a major disability).
37. See Cynthia Hubert, Transplant Pioneer Loses Battlefor Life, SACmAMEwo BEE, May 25, 1997, at Al
(explaining that while there had been complications after the surgery, Ms. Jensen had been enjoying relatively good
health).
38. Ua.; see id (indicating that Ms. Jensen "felt stronger than she had in years" and did not regret undergoing
the transplant operation).
39. Id, see id (explaining that Ms. Jensen developed lymphoma, which is a common side effect of the drugs
that suppress the immune system in order to prevent her body from rejecting the transplanted organ).
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The complications were unrelated to her disability and could have occurred in any
one receiving a like transplantO
APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Health and Safety Code § 7153.2 (new).
AB 2861 (Villaraigosa); 1996 STAT. Ch. 96.
40. Id., see i. (describing Ms. Jensen as an able and cooperative patient who according to her cardiologist,
Philip Bach, M.D., "'never had one problem with not taking her medications or managing her care. She followed
complicated medical regime beautifully").

